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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to speculate on what
caused the conservative Southern Democrats to bolt the
National Democratic Party and form the Dixiecrat Movement
of 19^3, and to demonstrate whether or not the proposed
thesis is in fact correct.
The proposed thesis is that the Dixiecrat Movement of
1 9 ^ 8 was the result of the internal struggle which had
disrupted the National Democratic Party from 1932 to 19^8,
In order to demonstrate the stated proposition, the
characteristics of the Dixiecrat Movement and the charac
teristics of its Deep Southern bailiwick are presented and
related to the characteristics of the conservative Southern
faction in the Democratic intra-party feud.
The leaders,
issues, interests, policies, strategy and tactics are
analyzed and compared in order to show the coincidence
between the objectives of the Dixiecrats and the objectives
of the conservative Southern Democrats who had opposed the
New Deal politics and policies of the National Democratic
Party and to establish the relationship between the Dixie
crats and the feuding conservative Southerners.
It was found that significant comparative material
exists and it is concluded that the proposed thesis is
valid.
It is further concluded that the Dixiecrat Movement
of 1 9 ^ 8 was not an isolated political phenomenon because it
has influenced political events in the South since 19^8.

viii

THE DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT OP 194-8
A STUDY IN POLITICAL CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1850 political parties were little known
except in the United States and Great Britain, but by 1950,
political parties had become intricate parts of the politi
cal systems in nearly every country in the western world.
Some students of the subject parallel the evolution of
political parties with the development of the political
institutions of a particular country, while others assert
that the development of political parties was the result
of social and economic conditions.
Maurice Duverger is representative of the group of
scholars who parallel the development of political parties
with the development of political institutions.

He states

that with the development of nineteenth century democracy
and the subsequent extensions of suffrage, already
existing legislative groups formed liaisons with electoral
committees in order to reach the newly enfranchised voters
and thereby gain supporters for the elections necessitated
by a democratic system.

The continuation, extension, and

strengthening of these ties developed into lasting
2

political parties,1

As democratic politics continued to

develop and become more sophisticated,

in both Europe and

the United States, Institutional theorists conclude that
political parties became similarly more effective and
important,
On the other hand, scholars such as Frank Sorauf state
that the formation of political parties was the product of
social and economic pressures evident in Europe and the
United States during the nineteenth century,

Sorauf con

tends that economic and social pressures directly influ
enced the formation of political factions and interest
groups that subsequently evolved into political parties.^
Although social and economic pressures probably
affected the formation of democratic institutions and
political parties, the causal relationship between such
pressures and the development of political parties should
not be considered primary.

Social and economic faction

alism existed before the nineteenth century under varied
3*Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1965)
xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxix and 212 j Gerald Pomper,
Nominating the President:
The Politics of Convention
Choice (New'York, 1966) 19-20? S. S. S c h a t tschneider,Party
Government (New York, 1942), 6 9 °
^Prank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American
System (Boston, 1964) 20-21? Moisie Ostrogorski, Democracy
and the Organization of Political Parties (Chicago^ 1964)
xxviii? and Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics; An
Inst 1 tut! ona 1 and Be ha v i ora 1 Appr oach (N ew" Y or k , 1 9i>BT 36,

political systems, but political parties did not e v o l v e . 3
Indeed, social and economic forces can be readily shown to
have affected the revolutionary changes which resulted in
the rise of democratic governments in Europe and the United
States, but without the institutionalization of democracy,
political parties or similar organizations would ha vs been
limited to functioning as pressure groups or special
interest groups.
Despite the differing interpretations regarding the
evolution of political parties, most scholars agree that
political parties pursue electoral success in order to
acquire political power.^

In functioning democratic

systems, the possession of political power hinges on elec
toral success and the subsequent control of government
which electoral success yields.
In the United States, the two party system developed
along with democratic Institutions.

The disestablishment

of the aristocratic caucus system in 1824 and the extension
of white male sufferage in 1828 affected the need to
acquire greater voter support in order to win elections,
3The term
organized body
candidates for
public office.
factions which
istics exclude

political parties is intended to mean an
of leaders and supporters which supports
the purpose of competing in elections for
This does not include interest groups or
lack electoral functions.
Such character
pre-19th Century "political parties".

^E. S. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
York, 1 9 6 5 ) 20? Duverger, op. cit., xxvi? Nelson W. Polsby
and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies
of American Electoral Politics (New York, 1 9 6 8 ) 24-26 ? and
Sorauf, o p . c i t ., £ and 9 .

5
and significantly Increased the level of competition
between the two predominant political p a r t i e s . 5
From 1828 to I860, the Importance of political parties
increased, and their functions expanded as the American
electoral system became more complex and the voters
Increased in number and were dispersed throughout the
expanding frontiers.

By i860 political parties had become

so intrinsic a part of the American political system that
the achievement of political power was determined by party
competition and strength.

This has remained true.

A major American political party is made up of a
loosely organized system of state and local party groups
which function, to a great extent, independently of one
another.

Every four years these groups assemble under the

auspices of the party*s national leadership in order to
nominate a presidential candidate and to support his bid
for election . 6

The major American political parties possess

little central power.

National officials conduct and

regulate a particular party *s convention,

but otherwise,

^Pomper, op. cit., 19*20.
As a result of the 1824
presidential election, there was a re-alignment of the
existing American political parties, and two parties formed
each supporting one of the major candidates of 1824.
The
Republicans formed behind John Adams and the Democrats
formed behind the defeated Andrew Jackson.
For information
regarding political party systems see Duverger, Political
Parties.
^Duverger, op. cit., 210; and Pomper, op. cit., 8 7 .

they are virtually powerless to control individual state
organizations .7
In order to elect its presidential candidate, a major
American party must gain support from a geographic,
occupational and ethnic cross-section of American voters.
In the United States it is not enough to gain the support
of a single region or type of voter , 8

and this requirement

has resulted in marked homogeneity between the major
American parties.

In their efforts not to alienate any

necessary element of the electorate, the major American
parties essentially present the same non-ideological
approach to issues, and in many instance^, it is difficult
to determine any significant differences between their
positions regarding major issues and policies.9
The *Winner-take~allM electoral arrangements of American
politics has made it extremely difficult for political
7Pomper, op. cit., 253s and Duverger, op. cit., 210.
Qpomper, op. cit., 8 .
9schattschneider, Semi-Sovereign People, 90-93•
(He
notes that a trend of nationalization has made the politi
cal parties more and more alike.) Also see Pomper, op. cit.,
?4.
(Pomper notes that differences are evident in party
platforms, but he concludes that parties most often dupli
cate each other in important matters.
Pomper *s treatment
of platform differences is tenuous as a refutation of the
homogeneity between the major U. S. parties.
Although he
lists divergent positions, he does not indicate how strongly
such differences were stressed in the campaigns or in which
geographic sections of the country and for which types of
voters such issues were pursued.
Because divergent views
were stated in platforms is no guarantee that they were
presented by the candidates to the voters.)
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parties other than the two major competitors to develop or
function.

Under the single-member district and the simple-

majority single-ballot presidential voting system, American
two-partyism has endured.10

However, the American

political party system has experienced the rise of many
minor or third—party movements.
In 19^8 the two major American political parties
engaged in presidential politics.

Also participating in

the 1 9 ^ 8 presidential election were two minor or third
political parties.

In contrast to the Democratic party and

the Hepublican party, neither of these minor parties had
ever participated in an American presidential election
prior to 19^8.

The following essay is devoted to a study

of one of the American third parties involved in the 19^8
presidential election, the Dixiecrat Movement of 1 9 ^ 8 .
In 1929 the Great Depression engulfed the United
States bringing economic and social deprivation to every
part of the country.

Largely due to a lack of economic

awareness, President Hoover and his administration
unsuccessfully struggled with the steadily worsening
situation.

In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt, a progressive

Democrat, was elected President, and he initiated a series
of economic and social programs which sought to stem the
lODuverger, op. cit., 217-218.
llThe Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 was officially known
as the States 1 Rights Party.
The term Dixiecrat was a
popularized title used during the 1 9 ^ 8 election by
journalists and writers, and this writer prefers to use
it because it conveys an impression of the sectional
character and local color of this third party movement.

8
Great Depression and which eventually transformed the
economic, social and political character of American life*
Through stringent Federal regulations, economic recovery
was slowly achieved, but the results of the New Deal were
not effected without significant disruption within the
ranks of the national Democratic party.

This intra

party struggle evolved into a bitter intra-party feud and
finally into open conflict.

The consequence of this feud

was the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948, and the evolution of
this movement is the subject of the ensuing study.

In

order to pursue this study, the following thesis is
proposeds

the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 was a narrowly

based, Deep Southern third party movement which arose from
an intra-party feud which split the national Democratic
party, during the period from 1932 to 1948, into liberal
and conservative, northern and southern factions.

This

intra-party feud was evident in both the presidential and
congressional politics of the Democratic Party; and, the
Dixiecrats were most successful in the black belt regions of
the Deep South.

By establishing this thesis, the

characteristics, interests, and objectives of the Dixiecrat
Movement of 1948 will be demonstrated, and by means of this
study, the political significance of the Dixiecrat Movement
of 1948 will be presented.

CHAPTER I
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLACK BELT
REGIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH

The proposed thesis states that the Dixiecrat Move
ment of 19^8 was a narrowly based Deep Southern third
party movement which was most successful in the black belt
regions of the South; therefore, a detailed analysis of the
geographic, economic, social and political characteristics
of the Deep Southern black belt regions will provide both
an introduction to the ensuing essay as well as data
essential to the examination of the proposed thesis.
The southern black belt regions of the United States
extend from Southside Virginia to East Texas, and reach
into North Florida, Southwest Tennessee and Southeast
Arkansas; and even a cursory inspection yields the conclu
sion that as an aggregate, the black belt regions
represent a geographically significant part of the
southern states.

Discounting the vastness of West Texas,

9

10
the black belt regions constitute approximately onequarter of the total land area of the American South.1
In 19^8 the American South possessed a predominantly
rural population, and among rural southerners, farmers and
farm laborers composed the largest income group.

The

Southern Editors Association estimated that 60 percent of
the total southern population was rural, and that over 7 1
percent of the rural population was involved in farming.^
The existence of a significant rura1-farm population is
consistent with the historical development of the southern
plantation-poor-white and yeoman-farmer system.

From 1820

to i860 the interior of the South was gradually transformed
from rugged frontier into large, family-owned plantations.
lSee Appendix I for a detailed geographic presentation
of the southern black belt regions.
The approximate
boundaries are highlighted by significant geographic loca
tions.
The boundaries were constructed by comparing V. 0.
Key*s non-detaiied outline of the black belt regions with a
detailed map of the Southern United States.
See V. 0.
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (Baton Rouge,
1 9 ^ ' 9 ; and Readeras Digest Great World Atlas
(Pleasantvilie, 1 9 6 3 ) ^7® or any" other detailed geographic
rendering of the southern states.
The southern black belt
regions are usually defined according to racial composition,
primarily being those regions with the greatest percentage
of black population.
However, this essay will develop a
definition of the black belt regions which identifies
other significant characteristics in addition to the usual
racial standard.
^The Southern Editors Association, The Southerners A
Biographical Encyclopaedia of the Southern People; A
Newspaper Reference Work (New Orleans, 19^51 9 and~l8; also
see, Calvin B. Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, Economic
Resources and Policies of the South (New York, 1951) ^1?
and John C. McKinney and Edgar T. Thompson, eds., The
South in Continuity and Change (Durham, 19&5) 203 and 228.
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The original settlers cleared the virgin southern forest
and took possession of extensive tracts of rich farm land.
These settlers gradually developed into prosperous backcountry gentlemen, and with the development of the cotton
gin, cotton became the mainstay of the southern economy.
Later settlers were forced to homestead le ss richly endowed
land, and consequently, a poor to semi-prosperous white
farmer group also emerged.

Regardless of the degree of

their prosperity, the majority of white southerners
achieved comparative self-sufficiency based on agriculture.3
The developing economy of almost the entire South was
based upon agriculture or the support of agriculture, and
until the advent of the Great Depression, cotton continued
to be the largest southern crop and the basis of the
southern economy.^
In the 1 930*s and 19**0*s the Great Depression and the
New Deal caused significant changes in the traditional
pattern of southern agriculture.

When it became

uneconomical to cultivate cotton exclusively, crop and
product diversification spread throughout the South.
Cotton cultivation was supplemented by wheat, alfalfa,
3see Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York,
1 9 ^ 1 ), for a detailed analysis of the development of the
South and southern agriculture.
*H/hen the bottom fell out of the cotton market,
severe economic hardship swept the South.
See, McKinney
and Thompson, op. cit., 203? Peter Molyneaux, "The Second
Civil War", Forum (August, 193*0 100-102? and Webster
Powell and Addison T. Cutler, "Tightening the Cotton Belt",
Harper*s Magazine (February, 193*0 308-318,

12
peanuts, soy beans, fruit, tobacco, and truck farming ; and
fallow farmland was utilized to raise beef and dairy cattle,
hogs and poultry.

New Deal crop limitations made it more

advantageous for farmers to have larger acreage units,
fewer workers and more machinery, and consequently, many of
those who had depended on farming were forced to find new
occupations,5

The black belt regions possessed the South*s

best farmland and the finest southern plantations were
usually located in black belt regions.

Indicative of the

amount of farming that was still being done throughout the
South in 19^8 was the fact that in 19^7 southern farmers
bought 5 5 percent of the total national fertilizer product.
Because large amounts of fertilizer are necessary to
replenish cotton impoverished land, and since the black
belts were f*King Cotton^s” domain,

it may be concluded that

a significant amount of the fertilizer purchased in the
South was being used by black belt farmers.^

Despite

changes such as diversification and consolidation, farming
continued to be a major occupation

throughout the South

and

in the black belt regions.?
5Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., **1 , 6 2 , and 1 0 8
(Page 108 lists the figures of the decline in agricultural
workers.)? and The Southerner, op. cit., 18.
^Hoover and Batchford,

op. cit.,

5*

?McKinney and Thompson, op. cit., 203*
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By 19^8 many of the industries and industrial centers
of the American South were located in black belt regions.
In 19^9 approximately one-sixth of the total United States
manufacturing establishments were located in the southern
states.

Southern industry employed approximately one-

seventh of the total United States production workers, and
disbursed a payroll amounting to about one-tenth of the
total United States industrial wage.

In 1 9 2 9 the six

largest southern industries were textiles,

lumber, food

production, tobacco, furniture and oil* and the most
industrialized states were North Carolina, Georgia and
T e x a s •®
Between 1935 and 1937 southern spinning mills
accounted for 85 percent of the cotton textile products
woven in the United States.9

in 1 9 4 5 cotton textile

manufacturing continued to be an important industry in
North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Alabamas and, in 19^7 the cotton textile industry was among
the four industries which employed over three-fifths of the
southern manufacturing production workers.-*-0

Major cotton

^Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 116.
The top six
industries were determined according to total production and
not according to the dollar value of the gross product.
9The Southerner, op. cit., 11.
10MeIvin L. Greenhut and W. Tate Whitman, eds., Essays
in Southern Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1964) 97.
C. Addison Hickman, 11The Entreprenurial Function:
The South
as a Case Study“ , reprinted in Greenhut and Whitman.

14
textile factories were concentrated in black belt areas
such as Birmingham, Winfield, and Fayette, Alabama, and
Atlanta, Georgia .H
In 1948 timber was one of the South*s most abundant
natural resources and the basis of one of the South's
largest and most widespread industries.

In 1945

approximately 55 percent of the land area of the South
was forest land and almost all of this timberland was
classified as commercial forests.12

Before the Depression,

lumbering and its allied industries had constituted a one
billion dollar business, and in 1947 it continued as one
of the top four southern industries in terms of the number
of production workers employed.-*-3

Much of the South's

commercial timberland was located in black belt regions,
and lumbering and by-product Industries were economically
important.

Georgia's black belt produced abundant supplies

of lumber and naval stores and in Alabama over 20 percent
of the wage earners were involved in the lumber business.
llThe Manufacturers Record Publishing Company, The
Blue Book of Southern Progress (Baltimore, 1946) 26 and 45.
l2Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 5 and 15*
This to
tal was calculated without including the plains of West
Texas or Oklahoma.
(They treated Oklahoma as Southern.)
13The Southerner, op. cit., 8 ? and Greenhut and
Whitman, op. cit., 97*

15
Most of Alabama’s twenty million acres of forest land
were located in its black belt,

Louisville, Mississippi,

a black belt community, was an Important lumbering center,
and Lufkin, Texas, the center of the newsprint paper
industry,

is in the Texas black belt.

The raw material of

the newsprint paper industry is southern slash p i n e . ^
In 1930 the South yielded 36 percent of the total
United States mineral product, and this percentage
represented the production of a one and one-half billion
dollar Industry.15

in 19^5 petroleum accounted for over

half of the total dollar value of southern minerals, and
the production of petroleum, coal and natural gas amounted
to 85 percent of the total value of southern mineral
production.

By 19^8, in terms of dollar value, Texas was

the leading southern mineral-producing state by virtue of
its petroleum and natural gas i n d u s t r y . ^

Over half of the

petroleum produced in the South came from Eastern and Gulf
Coast Texas, and it was estimated that 70 percent of the
national oil reserve was located in Oklahoma, Texas and
Louisiana.

A significant part of this reserve was also

calculated to be in off-shore regions.17
^ The Southerner, op. cit., 8 , 12, 1 3 , and 19; and The
Blue Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 20.
15The Southerner, op. cit., 8 .
l6 noover and Ratchford, op. cit., 119? and The Blue
Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 26.
l?Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 8 - 9 , 10 and 11.
Oil
fields were located along the southern Oklahoma border, in
Eastern and Gulf Coast Texas and in Southern and Gulf Coast
Louisiana.
The oil reserve was estimated to be 1^ billion
barrels.

16
Natural gas was also extracted from the oil rich land
of Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma,

It was calculated that

these regions possessed 80 percent of the natural gas
reserves and accounted for 7 0 percent of the natural gas
produced in the United States.18

The most significant coal

mining activities were located in Kentucky and in the area
surrounding Birmingham, Alabama.

The black belt coal mines

of Birmingham possessed an abundant supply of hard and soft
coal, and in Birmingham, coal was converted to coke for
industrial use,**-9

Louisiana black belt sources also

accounted for the entire supply of sulfur produced in the
United States, as well as limestone and other natural
chemicals . 2 0
Among the national totals recorded in 1937» the South
produced 2 0 percent of the pig iron, 1 7 percent of the
rolled iron and steel and 18 percent of the structural
and ornamental iron work produced in the United States.
The center of the iron and steel industry was Birmingham,
18ibid.. 11.
19lbid., 9-10i The Southerner, op. cit., 20s The Blue
Book of Southern Progress, op. cit., 20 and 28.
The
largest coke manufacturing facility in the South was
located in Birmingham, Alabama.
It was the Alabama
By-Products Corporation.
20100 percent of the United States sulfur supply was
extracted from the sulfur cone in Southern Louisiana*s
Plaquemines Parish.
Limestone was quarried around
Birmingham, Alabama, and was processed into lime and
cement.
See, Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 13? and The
Southernerg op. cit., 1 2 , 1 3 » and 1 9 - 2 0 .

/

Alabama, and In 1948, Birmingham continued to be an
important black belt industrial center , 2 1
Other significant black belt industrial centers
included Montgomery, Alabama? Macon and Savannah, Georgia?
Jacksonville, Florida? and Louisville, Mississippi . 2 2
From 1 9 2 9 to 1948 the hourly wages earned by southern
industrial workers amounted to less than 8 0 percent of the
national average industrial wage.

Since there was only one

salaried employee for approximately every thirteen hourly
workers, the number receiving wages below the national
average predominated.

Despite the fact that the over-all

average southern income had increased by 2 1 9 percent
between 1 9 2 9 and 1948, and industrial wages had increased
235 percent between 1939 and 1944, southern industrial
income still lagged behind the national average.23

The

consistently lower hourly wage scale of southern industrial
workers can b© attributed, at least in part, to the fact
that the development of industrial trade unions in the
South also lagged behind national development.

In 1946 the

21ln 1947 Birmingham ranked 28th among the 50 major
United States industrial concentrations. Other southern
cities ranked were Atlanta, 26th, and New Orleans, 35th.
See, Greenhut and Whitman, op. c i t ., 103.
Birmingham is
located near large deposits of coal, iron ore and limestone,
the basic components of steel, and is a significant iron and
steel producer.
See, The Southerner, op. cit., 12, 1 9 and
20? and The Blue Book of Southern Progress, op, cit., 20 and
32.
22The Southerner, op. cit., 18? and The Blue Book of
Southern Progress, op. cit., 20, 26 and 86T ” ”
“
23Hoover and Ratchford, op. cit., 48, 62 and 212? and
Frank A. Hanna, "Income In the South Since 1 9 2 9 ",
reprinted In Greenhut and Whitman, op. cit., 241-243.

CIO began a drive to enroll a million new southern members,
but by 1950 "Operation Dixie" represented a six million
dollar failure and ualon membership had actually dropped in
the South.

The failure of widespread unionization in the

South may be attributed to the fact that a significant
portion of the industrial labor force consisted of workers
who had been displaced from agricultural jobs, were
generally satisfied with having a job, and were fearful
of being terminated if they became associated with a union.
In some areas of the South, the drive to attract new
industry was the crucial factor against union organization.
Without unions, the potential for lower wages and longer
hours was used as a bargaining factor to attract new
developers.

Also of importance was the fact that without

unionization racial discrimination in relation to Industrial
jobs was more easily effected and continued, and this
"advantage” was attractive to southern middle-class
whit e workers.
From 1929 to 1948 the South evolved into an
economically important industrial section of the United
24MeKinney and Thompson, op. cit., 228? and Samuel
Lube11, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1 9 6 5 )
115-117.

19
States, and significant industrial development and
concentration was evident in the black belt regions.-^5
The social system of the southern black belt regions
was based upon the maintenance of white supremacy and the
legal segregation of the races.

This was generally evident

throughout the South, but since the black belt regions
possessed relatively fewer whites and high concentrations
of blacks, the incentive for white supremacy was stronger.
Whites and blacks attended different churches, schools and
theaters; used different public rest rooms; rode on
different buses or in designated parts of the same bus;
lived in different neighborhoods, ate in different
restaurants; went to different hospitals; and were even
buried in different cemeteries.

The color of skin was the

sole criterion used to determine which facility would be
utilized, and this resulted in two racially limited and
separated social systems.

The social system of the South

was enforced and legalized by MJim Crow*' laws which imposed
stringent regulations and inordinate penalties on blacks.
The laws were designed to control every form of social
^ I n d i c a t i v e of the developing character of southern
industry during this period was the fact that almost 3 0
percent of southern manufacturing establishments were
branch plants of non-southern industries and these branch
plants produced over 7 0 percent of the total dollar value
of southern manufactured products.
Branches were encour
aged by offers of tax preferences, lower utility rates and
cheaper labor.
See Greenhut and Whitman, op. cit., 99100 .

interaction between whites and blacks from public meetings
to marriage.26

Significant efforts were devoted also to

k e e p ing blacks legally disenfranchised, since without thb
ability to vote, the blacks were unable to interfere with
white control.2 7

Racism was overt and generally expected,

and blacks were legally segregated and considered to be
socially inferior.
Politically, black belt regions favored locally con
servative Democratic candidates who rigidly endorsed white
supremacy and were inclined toward the interests of the
large plantation owners and the industrial community.

By

comparison, regions outside of the black belts most often
supported candidates who were progressive by southern
standards since they were concerned with strengthening
the political and economic position of the less wealthy,
26it should also be noted that the subservient Negroes
were the ready source of cheap labor for the plantations
and factories of the black belt regions, and by keeping
them in "their places<! the white owners were sure of a
cheap labor force.
See, V. 0. Key, Southern Politics, 5*
8-10, and 531* Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of
Roosevelt;
The Crisis of the Old Order (VolT I )
(Cambridge, 1957) 111-115; and Ralph McGill, The South and
the Southerner (Boston, 19^3) 20-21.
27hey, Southern Politics, 5-6.
Key viewed the black
belts as the "backbone of southern political unity" and he
concluded that "Here, in the Southern black belts, the
problem of governance is similarly one of the control by a
small, white minority of a huge retarded, colored
population."
(Key was comparing the political control of
the South with British colonization.)
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small white farmers and laborers through regulation of
railroads and corporations and the adoption of legislation
favorable to their more modest

interests,^

The outlines of political factionalism in the South
were delineated by the radical agrarian Populist movement
of the 1 8 9 0 *3 .

In I 8 9 O the price of cotton dropped

significantly, western expansion slowed, money became ,5hardfl
and credit was almost unattainable.

As a result, small

farmers in debt faced foreclosure notices and large numbers
of farmers and farm laborers joined the unemployed ranks.
Reform movements such as the Greenback movement and the
Single Tax movement arose in the mid-West and attempted to
ease the plight of the farm poor.

In 1 8 9 2 mid-western

reformers gathered in Omaha, Nebraska, and launched the
Populist movement.

The Populists represented the

financially depressed rural interests of the mid-West and
the South, and they sought "easy 91 money by advocating the
transfer of fiscal control from the national banks to the
Federal banks.

In I 8 9 2 Williams Jennings Bryan ran for

president as the Populist candidate.

Bryan ran for the

"plain people", advocated government ownership of public
utilities and industry, and was strong in the non-black
28por a statement regarding the concerns of local
southern progressives see, Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive
South" reprinted in Dewey W. Grantham, J r . , ed., The South
and the Sectional Image?
The Sectional Theme Since
Reconstruct ion (New York, 19^7) 91*
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belt regions of the South,

In 1 8 9 6 Bryan and Tom Watson

of Georgia were the Populist candidates again, and after
being endorsed by the Democratic Party, the "Popocrat”
candidates won 47 percent of the popular vote.
non-black belt South supported Bryan,

Again the

In 1900 and 1904

Progressivism developed from Populism, and the black belt
regions of the South continued to oppose Bryan, Watson and
their heirs.29
During the first four decades of the twentieth
century, neo-Populist local progressive demagogues and
their local conservative counterparts dominated the
politics of the Deep South.

Local cognomens evolved which

indicated both the geographic boundaries and political atti
tudes of the different southern political factions.

Local

progressives were called hillbillies, rednecks, and woolhats,
and local conservatives were called planters and big mules,
and each faction established regional bailiwicks which
usually remained constant, at least during the period when a
particular leader actually was in power.
29Edwin P. Hoyt, Jr., Jumbos and Jackasses % A
Popular History of the Political Wars Cilew York, 1 9 6 0)
157-169, 1 7 2 , 17^-179* lS4, 1 9 6 , 204-206, 2 3 1 and 2 3 9 ;
C . Van Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Hebei (New York,
1938) i A, M, Arnett, The Populist Movement In Georgia
(New York, 1922); and Fred E. Haynes, Third Party Movements
Since the Civil War;
With Special Reference to Iowa: A
Study^of~S^cia 1 Poil11cs (New York, 1 9 65~) 2~. The objective
of the Populists and the subsequent progressive movements
were certainly anathema to the interests of the large
planters, industrialists and corporations of the black
belt regions.
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On the local level, both southern progressives and
conservatives were generally in accord regarding racial
issues30j but, in other policy areas, these factions were
widely separated.

According to southern standards,

progressive leaders represented the poorerclasses of white
and black farmers and laborers who lived in the more
economically and socially depressed rural areas of the
South.31

These leaders* reform programs included proposed

increases for industrial taxation and the limiting of
economic preferences for industries? increases in the taxa
tion of large planters? decreased taxation of the lower
income groups? better working conditions, higher wages, and
shorter hours; control of child labor abuses; better
schools, roads, and living conditions; and welfare
assistance for the aged.

The local conservative leaders

represented large plantation owners, business and Industrial
interests and some urban centers of the black belt.

They

supported lower agricultural and industrial taxation,
greater economic preference, and the principle of states*
rights.

They opposed Federal intervention in labor

practices, wage levels, control of natural resources,
30white supremacy was the dominant racial policy
throughout the South.
See, Key, Southern Politics, 8-9.
3lRobert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South
(New York, 1 9 6 8 ) 241.

regulation of local statutes and law
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Deep

southern redneck progressives such as "Big Jim 11 Folsom,
John Sparkman and Lister Hill of Alabama; James Byrnes and
Strom Thurmond33 of South Carolina; Ed Hivers, Senator
Richard B. Russell and Ellis Arnall of Georgia; Huey,
Russell and Earl Long of Louisiana; and Vardanian, Bilbo
and John C. Stennis of Mississippi were usually opponents
of local big mule conservatives such as Handy Ellis,
Gessner T. McCorvey, Judge Wilkinson and James A. Simpson
of Alabama; Gene and Herman Talmadge of Georgia; Ben
Tillman,

"Cotton E d 11 Smith and Cole Blease of South

Carolina; Sam Jones of Louisiana; and Fielding Wright and
Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi.

However, despite

the often bitter progressive versus conservative battles
experienced on the state and local levels, Deep Southern
Democrats

(locally progressive or conservative) generally

assumed conservative positions in matters related to
national policies and politics.34
32Arthur M. Schlesinger, J r . , The A ge of Roosevelt:
The Politics of Upheaval (Vol. Ill )~TCambridge» 19o0~) ^42-68
Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 105; Sherrill, op
c i t ., 8-13, 45, 49, 204, 241, and 246; Key, Southern
Politics, 232*
33Thurmond as Governor of South Carolina backed legis
lation for better education, roads, and working conditions,
and he included Negro interests in these proposed programs.
He even went so far as to prosecute a number of whites
accused of lynching a Negro.
34jn opposing the Bank Act of 1933, local progressives
such as Byrnes and Long joined with local conservatives
such as Bankhead, Connally and Sheppard; and in opposition
to Federal control of local agencies, conservatives such
as Connally, George, Sheppard, and Glass joined with
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In the 1928 presidential election local Deep Southern
factionalism was projected into national politics,

A1

Smith, an anti-Prohibition Catholic Democrat from New York,
was supported by southern voters in the locally conserva
tive black belt.

Herbert Hoover, a dry, Protestant, ex-

Bull Moose Progressive Republican drew support from areas
outside the black belt which were generally noted for
supporting local progressive politics.35
Although V. 0. K e y ’s data indicated this split, he
concluded that the Smith supporters were hard core
Democrats while the Hoover supporters were Democratic
’’switchers" influenced by the cries of "rum and Romanism".
Although much of the black belt favored a "wet" position
regarding Prohibition, this position was not universally
subscribed to,36 and with the exception of the Southern
local progressives such as Hatfield, Logan, Barkley and
Bankhead.
In both cases their national positions were
conservative.
See Congressional Record:
Proceedings and
Debates of the Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress
of tlie~lJnTtedr^~States^f^Sierica,' Vol.
- Part 2,
January 2 3 to February 9, 1934 (Washington, D. C . , 1934)
2193 ? and Congressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of
the Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the
United States of America, Vol. 76 - Part 3, January 24 to
February
1933 (Washing!on, D. C . , 1933) 2508-2517.
Similar cases can easily be found in the Congressional
Records.
35Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform:
From Bryan
to F 6 p. R . (New York, 1955) 326-327; and Key, Southern
Politics, 320-328.
36Key 9 Southern Politics, 138 and 23^.

26
Louisiana Catholic population, the largely Protestant
black belt did not reflect religious preferences in harmony
with Smithfs.37
Rather, in the person of A1 Smith, the urbane New
Yorker,

local conservative interests in the black belt may

have envisioned a less dangerous candidate than the
Progressive Republican Hoover.

Conversely, although the

"dry*9, Protestant southerners abhored A1 Smith, the fact
that the more progressive regions of the South almost
uniformly supported Hoover also suggests that his
political preferences, at least his anti-corporationism,
meshed with the political preferences of these southern
voters.
Geographically,

economically, socially and politically,

the black belt regions of the South constituted a clearly
defined section of the United States, and characteristically,
the black belts were generally distinct from other regions
of the Sourh.

37ibld., 160.

CHAPTER II
THE CHARACTERISTICS OP THE DIXIECRAT
MOVEMENT OF 19^3
The Dixiecrat Movement of 19*4-8 was a southern third
party movement, and support for the Dixiecrat Movement came
almost exclusively from the black belt regions of the Deep
Southern states.1

Alexander Heard correlated high Dixie

crat voter percentages with states and counties in which
high non-white populations existed, and he concluded
that the Dixiecrat candidates were most successful in
areas of high non-white population.^

The states with the

highest non-white populations possessed the most extensive
black belt regions, and in 1 9 ^ 8 , due to legal disenfran
chisement, southern blacks were usually powerless to
influence electoral politics.

In the black belts, voting

was almost exclusively reserved to white voters, especially
in the more rural areas.

Therefore, a more meaningful

conclusion is that the greatest percentages of the Dixie
crat votes came from a white minority living in the
I 9 8 . 8 percent of the Dixiecrat votes came from the
southern states, and the greatest concentration of this
total was in the Deep South.
See Alexander Heard, A Two
Party South? (Chapel Hill, 1952) 26.
2 Ibid«, 251.
27

predominantly non-white black belt regions of the South.
On the level of local politics, these areas were the
traditional conservative strongholds.
TABLE 1
DIXIECRAT VOTER SUPPORT AND THE RACIAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK BELT REGIONS
States with the most extensive black
Percentage of
belt regions as established by
popular vote for
estimated percentage of non-white
Dixiecrat candipopulation as of 1 9 5 0
__________ _____ dates in 1 9 ^ 8
State

Non-white population

Mississippi
South Carolina
Louisiana
Alabama
Georgia
North Carolina
Arkansas
Virginia
Florida
Tennessee
Texas

45.5
38.9
33.1
3 2 .1
30.9
2 6 .6
22.4
2 2 .2
2 1 .8
1 6 .1
11.5

8 7 .2
7 2 .0
49.1
79.8
20.3
8 .8
16.5
10.3
1 5 .6
13.4
9.3

The data indicates that the greatest Dixiecrat support
came from whites residing in areas with concentrated black
populations, and in the South, this meant black belt
regions.
Although county and precinct data would be more
conclusive, especially In relation to particular states, it
is considered that the compilation of such statistics
constitutes the proper topic for a separate study of this
one facet of the Dixiecrat Movement ; and, therefore, it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
In Texas, the Dixiecrats received over 85 percent of
their vote from the extreme eastern black belt counties
which generally had over 2 5 percent non-white residents.
In Arkansas, the Dixiecrats received over 75 percent of
their total vote from the black belt counties along the
eastern and southern borders of the state.

In Tennessee,

the black belt voter pattern continued as the Dixiecrats
polled the majority of their votes in the southwest corner
of the state around Memphis.
black belt region.

This is Tennessee’s only true

Although a direct correlation is less

evident in Virginia, the Dixiecrats were generally more
successful in black belt areas than outside of them.

The

North Carolina voter pattern is the only clearly defined
variation from the black belt regional strength exhibited
by the Dixiecrats.

This variation may be attributed to a

fairly keen two party struggle in North Carolina in which
the traditional stronghold of Democratic normalcy was in
North Carolina’s black belt.

Faced xtfith serious Republican

opposition, something generally unfamiliar in the rest of
the South, black belt Democratic North Carolinians remained
close to the national Democratic party.

Dixiecrat support

came from south-central North Carolina in the areas
surrounding the centers of North Carolina’s textile
industry.

In Florida, Dixiecrat support was evident only

in the extreme northern part of the state above Ocala.
This vote coincided with Florida’s small black belt region.
In the strongest Dixiecrat states, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia, the proDixiecrat voter pattern closely followed the outlines of
the black belt regions in each state.3
3Ibid., 251-279,
The data paraphrased in the above
text was carefully analyzed by Heard in the above-cited
section.
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As a result of their efforts, the Dixiecrats won more
than 20 percent of the South*s total popular vote and they
captured all of the electoral votes of four of the Deep
Southern states.

The Dixiecrats were able to compile these

astonishing statistics for an American third party because
they were successful in drawing voters to the polls.

They

achieved this by constructing a platform and by pursuing an
election campaign attacking what they asserted were the
anti-southern, totalitarian tendencies of the national
Democratic party and the Federal governments and, by
formulating a strategy and tactics focused upon electoral
success.
In Birmingham, Alabama,

on July 1?, 1948, a group of

dissident Southern Democrats, many of whom had only a few
days before bolted the National Democratic Presidential
Convention in Philadelphia, assembled to form and launch a
third party movement.^

The Birmingham ,Jconference,J

recommended j. Strom Thurmond, the Governor of South
Carolina, and Fielding Wright, the Governor of Mississippi,
as the Dixiecrat presidential and vice presidential candi
dates, and they adopted a platform consistent with their
interpretation of the principle of states* rights.

The

^ “Truman Shunned by Votes of South*8, New York Times
(July 15s 1948) 1; /'Southerners Plan to Fight Truman on
Electoral Vote”, New York Times (July 17, 1948) 1;
“Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate18, New York Times
(July 18, 1948) 3? and “Southerners Map Broad Campaign” ,
New York Times (July 19, 1948) 8 .
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underlying concept of the States' Bights Platform of
1948^

was expressed in the second paragraph of the plat

form which declared,

"We believe that the protection of

the American people against the onward march of totalitarian
government requires a faithful observance of Article X of
the American Bill of Rights” .^

The platform sought to

identify the Dixiecrats as a national party concerned with
national issues, but this effort only poorly veiled the
Dixiecrats 1 true sectionalism.

Through their platform,

the Dixiecrats asserted that the protection of states*
rights was the “cornerstone of the Democratic Party” but
due to the “usurpation of power by unfaithful leaders” ,
Democrats who believe in the preservation of constitutional
government and individual liberty found the Democratic
party intolerable.?

The Dixiecrats attacked the Executive

5The Dixiecrats were formally known as the States*
Rights Party.
^Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National
Party Platforms 1840-1956 (Urbana, 1956) 466.
Article X of
the Bill of Bights states, “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.” The basis for states' rights theory is
founded on this article and it depends upon a sympathetic
interpretation.
For such an interpretation of Article X
see, James J. Kilpatrick, “The Case of States' Rights'1,
reprinted in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States t
Essays on the American Federal System (Chicago,~^L960)"
"For a conf 11 c 1 1 ng interpre'tat 1 on see, Walter
Berns, “The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment” , also reprinted
in Goldwin.
7Porfcer and Johnson, op. cit., 466-46?.
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Department and the “politically minded” Supreme Court for
promoting gradual totalitarian rule In the United States,
and they claimed that recent executive and Judicial actions
were tantamount to the institution of “national dominion” .
They listed decisions involving submerged oil-bearing
lands, schools, primary elections, restrictive covenants
and religion as Justification for their assertion.®

From

this point, their platform began to represent southern
sectional concerns.

The Dixiecrats described themselves as

having been rejected and humiliated by the national
Democratic party because they "repeatedly remonstrated”
with the leadership regarding the totalitarian threat.

They

stated that the adoption of a civil rights program by the
national Democrats was "rigged to embarrass and humiliate
the South” because it would eliminate segregation and
discrimination of every kind.

They asserted that the

Department of Justice was to be reorganized in order to
enforce the civil rights program, and that such enforcement
would result in the formation of a police state.

After

reiterating the South's "rugged loyalty” to the national
Democratic party during previous presidential elections and
their "irrevocable commitment" to democracy as defined by
Jefferson, Jackson and Wilson, the Dixiecrats declared their
®Ibld., 467.
The decisions cited were in cases from
various parts of the country, and this probably represented
an attempt to give the movement a national character, or at
least submerge its sectionalism somewhat.
However, the
principles involved were of significant importance to
southern interests.
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belief in the Constitution,

Individual rights, the totali

tarian character of the compaign platforms adopted by both
major parties, the necessity of segregation, and the
inherent evil of equal civil rights, social equality, and
the regulation of employment practices, voting and local
law enforcement.

They affirmed that “effective e nf ore e me nt

of such a program would be utterly destructive to the
social, economic and political life of the Southern
people“9; and, they clearly delineated their opposition to
the usurpation "of legislative functions by the executive
and judicial departments.ir^ This platform constituted the
basis of Dixiecrat policy, and during the ensuing politi
cal campaign, the Dixiecrat leaders reiterated its
principles.
Governor Thurmond voiced the states* rights policy
throughout the campaign.

He told an audience that,

“we

consider the so-called civil rights legislation and many
other like questions to be reserved to the states by the
C o n s t i t u t i o n . D i x i e c r a t appeals were often excited by
overt racism, and Frank Dixon, the head of the movement in
Alabama, asserted that opposition to the civil rights
9ibid., 467-468.
lOlbid., 468.
See Appendix II for a complete presen
tation of the Dixiecrat platform.
H H e a r d , A Two Party South?, 27#
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program was all that was necessary for success,12

Generally,

the campaign attacked legislative and executive policies
which the Dixiecrats considered offensive to southern
interests and states1 rights.

During the campaign,

Thurmond challenged the Federal government’s right to
legislate restrictive regulations and to force the state
governments to comply.

He called such acts “Force Bills”

and singled out the anti-poll tax law, the anti-lynching
law, the anti-segretation law and the Fair Employment
Practices Commission as e x a m p l e s . ^

in Augusta, Georgia,

Thurmond told his audience that what they had to fear was
“a new kind of police state with all power centered in
Washington,”

He further warned them that the United

States was on the road to totalitarianism,1^

The

1 2 ibld., 2 6 - 2 7 , In general, overt racism was not the
predominant theme of the Dixiecrat appeal, but the usual
southern attitude against integration and equal rights was
clearly presented to the voters.
In the keynote address
before the Birmingham “conference” , Dixon said, “The South
will fight the attempt to mongrelize our people” , but later,
Thurmond rejected the help of Gerald L, K. Smith because
his racist appeals were too much for even Thurmond.
See,
Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York, 1959) 95?
John N. Popham, “Thurmond, Candidate of Rebels, Decries
’White Supremacy* Idea” , Mew York Times (July 20, 1948) 1?
and “The Souths
War Between the Democrats” , Newsweek
(July 26, 1948) 21,

! 3 “Third Partiess
Southern Revolt” , Time (October 11,
1948) 24; and Howard P. Nash, Jr., Third Parties in American
Politics (Washington, 1959) 307.
Thurmond made the “Force
B i l l ” Speech in Baltimore, Maryland.
3.4"Third Parties*
Dixiecrat Medley” , Time (October 4,
1948) 22.
For additional examples of similar campaign
speeches and appeals, see, Frank Freidel, F. D. R. and the
South (Baton Rouge, 1965) 96-97* ”Civil Rights”, Senior
Scholastic (October 6 , 1948) 10A; and John N. Popham,
“Southerners Name Thurmond to Lead Anti-Truman Fight” ,
New York Times (July 18, 1948) 1.

Dixiecrats believed that the issues confronted were
important to southern voters, and at different times during
the campaign, Thurmond confidently stated that they would
win from 1 0 0 to 140 electoral votes in the southern
states.3-5

The Dixiecrats were campaigning to achieve an

electoral victory, 3-6 and in addition to developing a
platform and campaign issues, they sought to implement a
strategy and tactics designed to achieve their objective.
In December,

1944, Charles Wallace Collins, an obscure,

retired constitutional attorney from Washington, D. C . ,
published an equally obscure book entitled Whither Solid
South.

In the book, Collins, a member of the Alabama bar,

sought to delineate the reasons and devise the method for
establishing the political control of the South by a small
group of well-to-do white southerners.3-7

Collins argued

many topics, including the necessity for and the correct
ness of white supremacy, the illegality of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the moral and religious case for continuing
3-5“Thurmond Expects 100 Electoral Votes”, New York
Times (October 1, 1948) 21? and “The Split in the South” ,
Newsweek (September 20, 1948) 2 9 .
3-^At least their public attitude was that they could
win the presidency, and they campaigned with that apparent
objective.
3-7There has been difficulty Involved in acquiring a
copy of Collins’ book? therefore, references to It will be
based on two diverse sources, neither of which cites the
ot h e r .
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segregation? and, he concluded with a ludicrous proposal
for a forty-ninth state in Africa designed to accommodate
American blacks.

According to Helen Puller, a contemporary

journalist, and Alexander Heard, Collins, in addition to
presenting his own biased ideas, also provided the con
ceptual basis and the strategic outline for the Dixiecrat
Movement.

In his book, Collins proposed two courses for

creating a southern regional party by taking over the
machinery of the Democratic party in the southern states.
One method was to throw the presidential election into
Congress whenever possible by putting up local candidates
and by voting for them in the electoral college, and the
other consisted of eliminating the presidential campaign
from the South by having presidential electors Instructed
by local officials, commissions or conventions,

Collins

considered that the logical conclusion would be a new
conservative political party.

Collins 1 book, which Helen

Fuller categorized as “second rate”, came to the attention
of Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi, and after
reading it, he sent a copy to Fielding Wright,

Following

a conference between Collins, Eastland and Wright, some 300
copies of the book were mailed to leading conservative
southerners including Strom Thurmond of South Carolina,
Frank Dixon of Alabama,

Merritt Gibson of Texas, Roy

Harris of Georgia, John U. Barr of Louisiana and Boss Ed
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Crump of Tennessee.18

When the Dixiecrat Movement eventually

developed Into an active third party, the influence of
Collins* thinking became evident in the strategy and
tactics adopted.

Strom Thurmond campaigned with the

Intention of winning enough southern electoral votes to
prevent either of the major parties from gaining a majority
from the electoral college.

As a result, the election

would have gone to the House of Representatives where the
Dixiecrats reasoned their candidates would probably be
chosen as a compromise.

However, if they failed to win

enough electoral votes to force the election Into Congress,
they were confident that they could take enough votes away
from Truman to cause his defeat.

With Truman defeated,

and the South in opposition, the Democratic party would be
badly divided, and the Dixecrats reasoned that by virtue
of their regional strength and stability they would be able
to assume a leadership role in the party and exercise
control in their own bailiwick.

As the movement became an

active third party, Senator Eastland of Mississippi and John
U. Barr of Louisiana were identified as Dixiecrat strategists.19
18Heard, A Two Party South?, 31-33 5 and Helen Fuller,
“The New Confederacy16, New Republic (December, 1948) 11-12.
19“Thurmond Expects 100 Electoral Votes*1, 2 1 ; Heard,
A Two Party South?, 19, 21 and 28? Helen Fuller, “The Fourth
Party“ , New Republic (March 15, 1948) 12? “Eights Party
Gains Mounting in the South'*, New York Times (September 12,
1948) 3 6 ? “The Souths A Political Phenomenon Grips
Dixie*s Voters", Newsweek (October 25, 194-8) 32-34? and S.
B. A d e r , “Why the Dixiecrats Failed", Journal of Politics
(August, 1953) 356-358.
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In an attempt to achieve the strategy, and to strengthen
their local control also, Dixiecrats tried to execute several
political tactics in the South.
Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama,

In Florida, Georgia, Texas,

Mississippi and South Carolina,

they attempted to take control of local Democratic party
organizations.

In most of these states, Dixiecrats already

held significant Democratic party positions, and from such
positions, they attempted to exert greater influence.

In

Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina, they
were successful in gaining control of the local Democratic
organization, and as a result, Thurmond and Wright appeared
on the ballot as the official Democratic candidates.
Throughout the South, Dixiecrats ran for election as
Democratic committeemen and advocated the adoption of
unassigned presidential electors.

The strategy and tactics

employed by the Dixiecrats closely resembled the political
methods proposed by Collins to develop a powerful,
regional,

independent southern Democratic party,^0

20several of the Dixiecrats who sought to achieve their
goals by means of the strategy and tactics described above
were Leander Perez, Frank Dixon, Frank Upchurch, Horace
Wilkinson, Gessner T. McCorvey and Ben Laney.
Perez, the
boss of Southern Louisiana’s mineral rich parishes, was the
guiding force behind the Dixiecrat takeover of that s t a t e ’s
Democratic party, and the removal of Tru m a n ’s name from
Louisiana’s ballot.
Frank Dixon engineered the Dixiecrat
takeover in Alabama and Horace Wilkinson, a Birmingham
attorney and judge, and Gessner T. McCorvey, the leader of the
Alabama black belt planters and the urban Industrialists,

Most southern political leaders avoided the Birmingham
^conference” and the Dixiecrat Movement despite their
national conservative character and their at least nominal
opposition to the New Deal.
categorized into two groups.

These leaders may be
The first group consisted of

southern politicians who, as a result of southern
factionalism, were local progressive leaders opposed to the
objectives, except the anti-civil rights objective, which
their local conservative counterparts were pursuing via the
Dixiecrat Movement.

The second group consisted of those

southern politicians who were politically in control in
their own states and who would have realized little advan
tage and possible significant harm from becoming associated
with the Dixiecrats.

In some cases the non-bolting

ran for elected office as Alabama presidential electors.
In Florida, Frank Upchurch, a leading state Democratic
committeeman, pressed the state committee to adopt a
system of unassigned presidential electors.
Ben Laney
of Arkansas, a former Governor, prominent businessman,
and head of the Arkansas Free Enterprise Association,
became Chairman of the Dixiecrat1s Executive Board and
for a brief period took control of the Arkansas Democratic
party.
Similar efforts occurred throughout the Deep
South, especially in the black belt regions.
See, V. 0.
Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 196 6 )
253-2557”Clinton Hossiter, Parties and Politics in
America (New York, 1 9 6 2 ) 3-10; “Report from the South”,
New York Times (July 25, 1958) 8 ; “Louisiana Strikes
Truman Off the Ballot”, New York Times (September 11, I 9 A 8 )
2 7 ; “Gaining Southern Revolt Helps Republicans” , New York
Times (September 13, 1958) 8 ; “Truman Hit in Tennessee” ,
New York Times (September 18, 1958) 8 ; “Dixiecrats Get
Oklahoma Listing” , New York Times (August 15, 1958) 55;
Ader, “Why Dixiecrats Failed”, 318; and Heard, A Two Party
South?, 2 7 7 .

southerners may have also anticipated the failure of the
movement and the subsequent punitive measures which the
national Democratic party might attempt to enact against
the bolters.
Among the political leaders found In the first group
were “Big Jim“ Folsom of Alabamaf Herman Talmadge and
Senator Russell of Georgia, and Senator John G. Stennis
of Mississippi.
“Big Jim” Folsom was an anti-New Deal Alabama local
progressive who campaigned among the poor farmers and
laborers with a neo-Populist style.

In 1958 he defeated

Handy Ellis, a black belt conservative and soon to be
Dixiecrat, for the g o v e r n o r s h i p . ^

In 1958 Herman

Talmadge was running for the governorship of Georgia left
open by his father*s death.

Gene Talmadge and his son

Herman were both heirs to the Populism of Tom Watson,
and Herman continued his father’s anti-New Dealism.

Herman

Talmadge possessed a more moderate political demeanor
than his demagogue father, and this, in addition to his
progressive background and his personal antipathy for
Thurmond, separated him from the local conservatives at
21Key, Southern Politics, 52-53.
The Folsom versus
Ellis election was a classic example of a neo-Populist
versus a local southern conservative election.
Ellis’
strength came from the black belt and Fols o m ’s from the
poor agrarian counties outside of the black belt.
Folsom
campaigned as an agrarian radical while Ellis conducted
his campaign in accordance with the interests of the black
belt constituents and financial supporters.

Birmingham,22

Georgia’s Senator Russell represented a

moderate southern position and he also found Thurmond
personally distasteful.

Despite his anti-New Dealism,

he did not appear at Birmingham nor did he become a
Dixiecrat.23

John C. Stennis is a local progressive who

represents the hill counties of Mississippi.

In 19^-8

Stennis had no interest in a conference or a movement
with the local conservative representatives of the
Mississippi Delta, such as Eastland and Wright,2^
Southern political leaders such as Harry Byrd of
Virginia, E. H. s,BossM Crump of Tennessee, and Earl and
Russell Long of Louisiana were typical of those in the
latter group.

Byrd possessed a firm grip on Virginia

politics by means of his control of the rural political
organization.

Byrd had been a progressive governor and

was not a racial demagogue.

He was anti-New Deal, but

never to the point where his control of Federal patronage
was endangered.

In Virginia, racism was not overt,

22j£ey, southern Politics, 109-112 % and Sherrill,
op. cit,, 2 ^ 9 .
23Key, Southern Politics, 56? and Sherrill,

op. cit.,

249.
2^stennis is from Kemper County on the eastern border
of Mississippi in the hill country.
Stennis and Eastland,
as U. S. Senators, have often disagreed, particulaz^ly in
regard to racial matters.
Stennis is a racial moderate
and Eastland is a racist.
In recent years, they have come
closer together but in 19^8 Stennis had no desire to bolt
the national Democratic party or associate with Delta
politics.
See, Key, Southern Politics, 252-253? and
Sherrill, op. cit., 205“203”i 2 1 2 - 2 1 4 , and 317*

^3
apportionment was in favor of the rural areas, business
possessed a secondary position and industrial money was
not generally able to force political action.

Unlike

the politics of the Deep South, the Byrd Machine functioned
with smooth, businesslike efficiency as typified by E. R.
"Ebbie" Combs, the powerful and effective Clerk of the
Virginia State Senate.^5

clearly, Byrd had little in

common with the leaders of the Birmingham ''conference”
and even less to gain from participating in the Dixiecrat
Movement•
The Crump Machine was effictively in control of the
politics of Tennessee, and despite anti-New Deal senti
ments, Tennessee political figures avoided Birmingham.
Although Crump initially endorsed Thurmond, when the time
came actually to oppose Truman and support Thurmond, Crump,
under pressure from his own organization, backed Truman, °
Again, little if anything could have been gained for
Tennessee Democrats if their support had gone to Thurmond
and the Dixiecrats.

In Louisiana the Longs were in control.

Earl had been elected governor over future Dixiecrat Sam
Jones and Russell had been elected Senator.

Following

Huey's assassination, Earl and Russell had mended relations
25Harvie Wilkinson, III, Harry Byrd and the Changing
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1967> (Charlottesville,
1 9 6 6 ) 6 , 7 , 1 1 , 23, 24-25, 4o, 4l,' 4?-48, 50, 52, 6 o,
64-65 j and Key, Southern Politics, 19-35•
2 6 "Truman Hit in Tennessee”, New York Times
(September 18, 1948) 8 ; and Key, Southern Politics, 48, 58,
64, and 337*

with the Roosevelt Administration, and despite Federal
prosecutions of minor Long officials on income tax
charges, relations remained smooth.

Opposition to the

national Democratic party could only have upset the pattern
of Louisiana politics and harmed their local hegemony.
In addition, the Long's were traditionally strongest in
the old Populist strongholds of Louisiana, and so,
association with the "Big Mule 11 Dixiecrats could have
weakened their voter support.27
The fact that James Byrnes of South Carolina avoided
the Birmingham "conference" and the Dixiecrat Movement
cannot be as easily explained as could the similar action
taken by other southern political leaders.

Byrnes was a

progressive by South Carolina standards, he was bitterly
anti-Roosevelt and anti-New Deal? and he had been the
primary political supporter of the 1946 gubernatorial
effort of Strom Thurmond.

He had helped to form Thurmond's

political style and attitudes, but in 1948, at least
overtly, he stayed a?/ay from the Dixiecrat Movement.

Byrnes

2?Key, Southern Politics, 161-164? and Sherrill, op. cit.
15-17*
In 1948 the Longs were probably not actually southern
progressives, but they did campaign against the "interest".
Actually, they maintained close relations with key local
conservative figures such as Leander Perez.
Through careful
manipulation of local laws, Perez had acquired control of the
financial management of southern Louisiana oil and sulfur,
and he was politically powerful.
Perez had been one of
Huey's lawyers during his 1928 Impeachment trial as governor,
and a sort of friendship developed.
In 1948 Perez engineered
the dropping of Truman's name from the Louisiana ballot.
With such connections, it would be difficult to call the
Longs local progressives, but they did appear as such.
See,
Williams, op. cit., 11, 3 6 9 » 396, 400-402? Sherrill, op.
cit., 1 2 - 1 3 , and 15-17*
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was probably more Influenced by the belief that Thurmond
would fail and by his own aspirations for a national
political position.

Byrnes subsequently became T r u m a n 1s

Secretary of State, and later,

in 1954 he supported

Thurmond's bid for the U. S. Senate «^8
The Dixiecrats were successful in attracting signifi
cant financial supporters, some of whom had previously
backed Republican candidates.

These supporters generally

represented southern industrial and agricultural interests
which opposed New Deal regulations, particularly price and
wage control.

Among these financial supporters were

Robert Wood of Sears, Roebuck, Pierre S. duPont, the Vice
President of E. I. duPont de Nemours, A. G. Heinsohn, a
southern textile baron, Roger Milliken, the chief financier
of South Carolina Republicanism, and oilmen H. L. Hunt and
J. Howard Pew.29

These supporters, and their Dixiecrat

28‘rhurmond*s participation in the Dixiecrat Movement,
when viewed in light of his southern progressive background,
as Governor of South Carolina, seems somewhat incongruous.
However, Thurmond possessed a single-mindedness in matters
of race, religion, and communism that probably caused him to
identify almost ideologically with the objectives of the
Dixiecrat Movement.
Thurmond did not bolt the Democratic
Convention, he did not represent black belt interests as
clearly as other Dixiecrats, but in Birmingham he embraced
a movement which sought to combat the influences being
exerted upon the South by the Federal government which he
believed were left-wing and therefore anathaxna.
See,
Sherrill, op. cit., 240, 242, 246-250 and 252.
29Many individual Dixiecrats were also connected with
southern anti-New Deal financial interests.
For specific
information regarding these Dixiecrats see Chapter III,pp. 828 7 of this paper and the sources cited in reference to John
U. Barr ( 8 3 ), Leander Perez (83 )* “Business B e n ” Laney
(83 ), Gessner T. McCorvey ( 8 4 ) , Horace Wilkinson ( 8 4 ) ,
Palmer Bradley ( 8 5 ), and Marion Rushton ( 85 )*

counterparts, were probably attracted to the movement by
Dixiecrat policies related to industry, labor practices,
natural resources and Federal intervention.

It has been

asserted that there was corruption involved in the financial
dealings of the movement, but a demonstration of such
allegations,
essay,30

even if possible, is beyond the scope of this

Maurice Duverger noted that external organizations

such as industrial and commercial groups can affect political
parties, but to demonstrate whether or not these influences
are opposed to the common good is most difficult since as
Duverger concludes, they are always cloaked in discretion.33In relation to the present discussion of the Dixiecrat
Movement, it is sufficient to note that these contributions
existed, and that they were representative of significant
anti-New Deal southern industrial and economic interests,32
30william J. Primm, J r . , Assistant Democratic National
Chairman, charged that the financial support afforded the
Dixiecrat Movement by oil and utility interests was a
corrupt practice 5 and, journalists Edward A. Harris and
Thomas L. Stokes made similar accusations during the I 9 A 8
presidential campaign.
See "Rights Party Files Costs Tardy",
New York Times (September 17* 19^8) 20% "Soviet Like Act
Laid to Louisiana", New York Times (September 12, I 9 4 B) 375
and Ader, "Why the Dixiecrats Failed", 365-367•
For
additional information see, Heard, A Two Party South?, 2 9 7 2 9 8 ? Key, Southern Politics, 3 2 9 j Ader, The Dixiecrat
Movement, 9 6 ? and A b e l s , op. c i t •, 209«
3lDuverger, op. cit., XXXIV.
32b. U. Ratchford, "Recent Economic Development in the
South", Journal of Politics ( m y , 19^8) 277-2?8? R. J. Harris,
"States 1 Rights and Vested Interests", Journal of Politics
(November, 1953) ^ 6 6 - ^ 6 7 ; Alexander Heard, The Cost of
Democracy (Chapel Hill, i 9 6 0 ) 5^ and 122 % and Sherrill,
op. c i t ., 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 .
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To summarize,

in 19^8 a southern third party movement

possessing a narrow political and economic base arose in
opposition to the national Democratic party and the
Federal government.

Support for this movement came almost

entirely from white southerners living in regions of the
South marked by large plantations, growing industry, racial
discrimination,

segregation and local conservative

Democratic factionalism; and this third party movement, the
Dixiecrat Movement, adopted a strategy and tactics
originally conceived to establish conservative southern
regional political strength.

CHAPTER-III
WHY THE DIXIECRATS?
T
f* V\n
o
X V
x xc* Q

been demonstrated that the Dixiecrat Movement

of 19^8 arose in the black belt regions of the South and
that the movement opposed the domestic policies of the
Democratic party and the Federal government.

In order to

prove or disprove the proposed thesis, a demonstration of
why the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 arose is crucial.
Between i860 and 1932 the Republicans, with few
exceptions, constituted the majority party nationally, and
by pursuing policies of economic laissez-faire and stat e s 9
rights, they encouraged corporate capitalism.

During this

same period the Democratic party represented the minority
in opposition, and it was supported by a loosely organized
farmer-labor coalition.

Periodically, third party reform

movements developed to oppose the economic abuses of Big
Business and the Republican Party, but not until after the
1929 stock market crash and the subsequent Depression, were
reforms achieved.
lEric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York,
1952) 255“265, 2 6 9 - 2 7 3 and ~2B6-2 8 9 !" and Hofstadter, op.
cit., 300-325.
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In 1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt revitalized the
Democratic party by skillfully constructing a coalition of
small farmers and laborers from nearly every section of the
country into the majority party,

A number of ethnic groups,

the previously Republican Negro bloc, and many white collar
workers also supported Roosevelt,

His campaign emphasized

the plight of the "little m a n ” caused by the Great
Depression, and he promised economic and social reforms
designed to foster relief and recovery.

Roosevelt won the

support of key urban areas in New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, Michigan, and Texas, and this, coupled with his
farmer-labor strength, provided the margin for victory . 2
Following his election, Roosevelt instituted economic and
social reforms based upon direct Federal intervention and
control.3
^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Dea l , 504-505.
3Erie F. Goldman summarized the beginning of the New
Deal as follows 1 "The day after the Inaugural the new
President (Roosevelt) proclaimed a four day bank holiday,
summoned Congress into special session, and started dayand-night White House conferences on emergency banking
legislation . . . .
The Hundred Days were under way, the
most controlled, directed, overpowered period in all the
history of Congress.” Legislation was passed during the
Hundred Days to Insure bank deposits and stock purchases,
ease Federal credit to small farmers and homeowners,
reorganize the railroads, prevent phony bankruptcy
proceedings, impose excess profit and dividend taxes,
create the Civilian Conservation Corps, and raise prices
by taking the country off the gold standard.
Goldman, op,
cit., 255*
Also see Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval,
18, ?2, and 115; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New D ea l ,
424-428, 484, 471, 486, and 502; and Hofstadter, op. cit.,
304-305.

At the 1932 Democratic convention, conservative
southern delegates contested Roosevelt’s nomination, and
they exercised cautious control over the progressive
candidate from New York.

Roosevelt’s strongest opponent

for the presidential nomination was John Nance Garner of
Texas, and he was also opposed by Harry F. Byrd of
Virginia,

"Alfalfa Bill” Murray of Oklahoma and Albert

Ritchie, the Governor of the border state Maryland.
Facing such opposition, Roosevelt avoided controversy, and
in order to weaken conservative southern opposition, he
indicated that he would select Garner as his vice presi
dential runningmate

Some nor t h e m Democrats sought

Roosevelt’s support in a debate against the two-thirds
rule, but he tactfully declined by stating that It would
be unfair to take a position at that

time.

3

Roosevelt’s

standing among the southern delegates improved when Huey
Long, at that time pro-Roosevelt, exerted his influence
a n d eheld important southern votes in line at critical
^Hubert Eaton, Presidential Timbers
A History of the
Nominating Conventions
"York, "1964)
Eugene Roseboom., A History of Presidential Elections
(New York, 1964) 43"B.
5f. D, R . * s convention tactics were probably influ
enced by the fact that the Democratic National Convention
was conducted in accordance with a two-thirds rule which
required a two-thirds vote for the nomination of the
presidential candidate.
The rule dated from the 1832
Democratic convention and provided the minority South with
a veto power over the most vital decision of the party.
If
Roosevelt chose to Ignore this rule or oppose it in a
situation where he already faced southern opposition, he
probably would have been defeated in convention.
See,
Pomper, op. cit., 28.
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moments."*^

The 1932 Democratic convention conformed to a

standard favored by most southern Democrats.

They

demonstrated intra-party power by controlling the vice
presidency, they limited F. D. R. ’s policy preferences in
the platform, and they exerted over-all Influence on the
character of the 1932 Democratic campaign issues.?
By 1936 the initial phase of the New Deal had extended
Federal control into almost every aspect of the economic
and social recovery of America, and as evidenced by the
landslide Democratic victory of 1936, Roosevelt’s popu
larity had become prodigious.

However, the presidential

politics of 1 9 3 6 were also marked by continued conservative
southern opposition to Roosevelt and the growing liberal
wing of the Democratic party.
In 1935 a group of conservative southern Democrats
initiated a third party movement designed to oppose F. D. R.’s
renomination.

Under the leadership of Gerald L. K. Smith,

this movement planned to nominate Eugene Talmadge of
Georgia as the true Democratic candidate.

However, the

so-called "Jeffersonian Democrats" lost momentum as the
similarly intended Lemke-for-President movement began in
6 williams,

op. cit., 6 - 7 *

?Eaton, op. cit., 337-345; and Roseboom, op. cit.,
437-438.

the midwestern states, and when Smith moved to the Lemke
camp, the Talmadge movement ended.®
Roosevelt’s landslide victory overwhelmed the opposi
tion movements, but these movements initiated open conflict
between conservative Democrats and their Increasingly
liberal opponents within the party.
At the 1936 Democratic presidential convention,
conservative southern Democrats sought to upset Roosevelt’s
nomination, and under the leadership of Senator "Cotton
Ed" Smith of South Carolina, they demonstrated their
opposition to Roosevelt.

These efforts failed to influence

the unity which Roosevelt had effected in the Democratic
party.

Prior to the nomination voting, the Rules Committee

abolished the traditional two-thirds rule, and this single
rule change ended the nearly century long veto power which
southern Democrats had possessed over the proceedings of
the presidential convention.
Although Roosevelt was seeking an unprecedented third
term in 1940, conservative southern opposition to his
^Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 459-552;
Lube11, o p e cit., l42-l43? Roseboom, op. cit., 452; also
see, Key, Southern Politics, 116.

53
nomination was weak and uncoordinated.9

However, conserva

tive. southern opposition developed against Roosevelt’s
selection of arch-liberal,
presidential nomination.

Henry A. Wallace for the vice
Anti-Wallace forces were led

by A l a b a m a ’s anti-New Deal Senator Bankhead, but despite
this effort, Henry Wallace was nominated. H
In 1944 presidential politics were marked by intensi
fied bitterness between the conservative southern wing of
the Democratic party and Roosevelt’s liberal wing of the
9Saton, op. cit., 362? and Roseboom, op. cit., 468 and
471.
Roosevelt, by seeking a third term, violated the
unwritten rule initiated by George Washington when he
stepped down after two terms.
Every other American
president had followed Washington’s example.
Roosevelt’s
break with tradition was probably inspired by his unwilling
ness to leave office in a time of crisis and by his own
ego.
The voters were probably willing to support him because
of the grave domestic crisis from which he was leading a
rally via the New Deal, and because of the international
threat being posed by the impending World War II and his
promise to keep the United States out of the European war.
The fear of a leadership change was probably the single most
important factor involved in his renomination for a third
term.
Southern Democrats refrained from directly attacking
his leadership role since such a move would have been
unpopular with the electorate in general, and if Roosevelt
was re-elected despite their opposition, their control of
patronage would have been diminished and their ability to
influence national policies would have been further
reduced.
lOpomper, op. cit., 164.
This writer also prefers the
term selection rather than nomination to describe the vice
presidential candidate since this candidate is most often
selected by the presidential candidate and his nomination
by a convention is little more than a rubber stamp
ratification.
llEatcn, op. cit., 392? Roseboom, op. cit,, 468? and
Pomper, op, cit., 164? also see. Key, Southern Politics,
365 for data indicative of Senator Bankhead’s anti-New
Deal southern conservatism.

party.

In 1944 conservative Democrats from Alabama,

Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, and Texas sought to
prevent Roosevelt’s again unprecedented fourth nomination
by selecting or electing convention delegates who were
pledged,

instructed,

or inclined to vote against a

Democratic ticket headed by F. D. R.

These states also

sought to utilize a system of unassigned presidential
electors.^

Threatening not to support Roosevelt even if

nominated, conservative southerners arrived at the 1944
convention and they demanded that the two-thirds rule be
reinstated, that Henry Wallace be replaced as the vice
presidential candidate, and that white supremacy be
recognized.

The rebellious southerners placed the name

of Virginian Harry Byrd in nomination for president.

This

movement gained support among the delegates of the seven
Deep Southern states, and controversy persisted as the
anti-Roosevelt Texas delegation staged a walkout following
the Rules Committee’s decision that they would have to
share their nominating votes with a rival pro-Roosevelt
delegation.13

In spite of these tactics, Roosevelt was

renominated.
l^Heard, A Two Party South?, 159? and Roseboom,

op. c

579.
13These rebellious Texans later formed the unsuccess
ful third party movement known as the Texas Regulars.
See
Heard, A Two Party South?, 55» 65 s and 159*

Conservative southern delegates also fought Wallace’s
renominatlon, and Roosevelt, seeking to obviate conflict,
stated that he would allow the open convention to nominate
the vice presidential candidate.

Harry Truman, the choice

of the northern city machines, was subsequently nominated.
He was not selected by the southerners, but they did not
oppose him either, since coming from a border state, he
was probably the best candidate available to them.1^
Although the strength of party affiliation and the
desire to control patronage caused most conservative
southern Democrats to remain loyal to the party in 1944,
some dissidents chose to continue the conflict outside of
the bounds of the p a r t y . ^

jn Texas, Merritt Gibson

l4Roseboom, op. cit., 485-486? and Pomper, op. cit.,
104.
Pomper stated, MIn 1944, the nomination of Truman for
Vice President was first approved toy union leaders before
the delegates acted.
According to legend, convention
managers were told to ’clear it with S i d n e y 1, meaning
Sidney fixliman, head of the C. I. 0. Political Action
Committee.
Even if this is only fancy, the fact of a labor
veto power over the nomination seems established.” One
Senate reporter stated that in 1944 Hillman was also
responsible for Jimmy Byrnes of South Carolina being
eliminated from consideration for the vice presidential
nomination.
This same reporter noted the bitterness
evident among the Mississippi and Virginia delegates.
In
caucus, the Mississippi delegates came within a few votes of
supporting Henry Wallace on the deliberate assumption that
he would be the best choice to weaken the ticket and cause
F. D. R* ®s downfall.
The Virginia delegation was speci
fically instructed to vote against Henry Wallace and also
specifically uninstructed on how to vote for the presiden
tial candidate.
See, Allen Drury, A Senate Journal (New
York, 1963) 215, 219, and 220-221.
^Pomper,

op. cit., 164-165.

headed the third party known as the Texas Regulars? In
South Carolina another unsuccessful third party movement
arose? and in Louisiana, John U. Barr, a wealthy anti-New
Deal businessman,

initiated a Byrd-for-President movement.

Anti-Roosevelt presidential electors were gradually
ferreted out by the regular Democratic party organizations
in the Deep South, and the attempted coup by conservative
southern Democrats was generally unsuccessful? but was
openly f o m e n t e d . ^
Presidential politics from 1932 to 1944 evidenced
increasing divisiveness and bitterness between conservative
southern Democrats and pro-Roosevelt liberal Democrats.
Similar Democratic divisiveness was also evident in
Congress during this period, and by analyzing the
congressional proceedings related to some important issues,
an understanding of why this Democratic intra-party feud
developed may be achieved.
In 1932, the South was in desperate need of economic
relief, and in Congress conservative southerners generally
refrained from active opposition to relief legislation . 1 ’’7
During the Hundred Days, New Deal legislation created the
l^Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1966),
265? Freidel, op. cit., 51-52? Heard, A Two Party South?,
55* 159* and 258-259? and Fuller, MNew Confederacy” , 10.
17Goldman, op. cit., 255? Schlesinger, The Coming of
the New D e a l , 424-428, 484, 4yi, 484 and 502? and
Hofstadter, op. cit., 304-305.

Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Civil Conserva
tion Administration and numerous other boards and agencies
dedicated to economic and social recovery.

However, before

the first year of the New Deal Era had expired,

southern

Democrats began to oppose Roosevelt’s legislative programs
and policies.
3-8r
phe roll call voting data presented in the following
pages has been taken from the Congressional Record of the
Senate only. As demonstrated by V. 0. Key, between 1933 and
1946 southerners in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate possessed a higher rate of voting solidarity than
any other regional or coalition group, but the southern
Senators and Representatives were by no means cohesive in
regard to every issue.
According to K e y ’s data, southern
solidarity was most evident in roll call votes on racial
matters such as civil rights legislation and economic
matters which directly affected local southern interests
such as legislation to set cotton prices.
The roll call
voting data presented below is primarily concerned with
these types of issues, and therefore, the data related to
one house of Congress should not be expected to differ
materially from the data related to the other house.
In
other words, the Senate data shown below, when considered
in light of Key's conclusions for this period, should be
considered representative of the attitudes of southerners
in both houses in regard to racial Issues and locally
important economic questions.
Although the voting behavior
of the house members could be related to the characteristics
of relatively small southern districts, the effort involved
in such an analysis, when considered in light of the
similarities in southern voting cohesion in both the House
and the Senate, would probably not yield conclusions
significantly different from an analysis of more confined
Senate data.
As demonstrated on pages 7 2
through 76 of
this paper, this approach proves feasible at least for the
purposes of this paper, since the participation of signi
ficant conservative southern Democratic Senators in the
Dixiecrat Movement can be distinctly related to their
Congressional voting behavior and their local geographic
surroundings. This comparative approach was also adopted
because a number of southern Senators were identified as
having been Dixiecrats, while participation in the movement
was less marked among southern Representatives.
With this
being the case, the expectations of gathering signifleant
data was believed to be more probable from a consideration
of Senate data.
See, Key, Southern Politics, 345-382, for a
detailed analysis of the voting behavior of southerners in

The Bank Act of 1933 provided for safer and more
effective use of the assets of Federal Reserve Banks and of
national banking associations; it regulated interbank
control; and it prevented the undue diversion of funds into
speculative operations.

Huey Long, who by January of 1933

had become anti-administration, called the Banking Act a
perversion of American principles and ideals, and told the
assembled Senate that the bill had no more chance of
becoming law than he had of becoming the ”Pope of Rome”.
However, Long was wrong, and despite southern opposition,
the Bank Act was passed.
TABLE 2
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS
ON THE BANK ACT OF 1933
Yea
Bailey
Barkley
Black
George
Glass

Nay
Connolly
Sheppard

Not Voting
Bankhead
Broussard
Byrnes
Caraway
Cohen

the House and Senate. K@y9s analysis is of particular
interest because he works with the same time period as does
this study.
In the following analysis of the Senate data,
much significance was attributed to the non-voting southern
Senators as well as those who voted yea or nay.
The
assumption is that by not voting the particular senator was
probably registering a negative attitude since he could have
voted if present or could have had his vote counted by
pairing with another senator if his attitude was positive.
By abstaining or by not pairing with a nay voting
colleague, a senator could avoid a possibly unfavorable
direct confrontation with the administration and still
present his negative inclination.
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Fletcher
Hatfield
Logan
Longa
Neely
Stephens
Swansonl9

Harrison
MeKeliar
Robinson
Russell
Smith
Trammell

aThe fact that Huey Long did not vote despite
the fact that he was present and opposed to the
bllly is indicative of the correctness of the
assumption that non-voting indicates a negative
attitude.
Prior to the passage of the Bank Act of 1933* an amend
ment to the bill providing for guaranteed bank deposits was
introduced and approved by the Senate.

However, southern

opposition to this amendment was almost unanimous.
TABLE 3
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON AN AMENDMENT
TO THE BANK ACT OF 1933 TO GUARANTEE BANK DEPOSITS
Yea
Hatfield

Nay
Bankhead
Caraway
Logan
Neely
Stephens

Not Voting
Bailey
Barkley
Black
Broussard
Byrnes
Connally
George
Glass
Long
Reynolds
Robinson
Russell
Sheppard
Smith
Swanson
Thomas
Trammell^0

19congressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the United
St'ates"“nofr America, Vol. ?6 ^ Part 3~t January 2^, 1933 to
”
February 4, 1933 (Washington, D. C ., 1933) 2508-2517 for a
complete record of the debate and vote on the Bank Act of
1933.
20ibld., 2512.
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In December,

1932 Hugo Black of Alabama introduced a

bill in the Senate to reduce working hours by prohibiting
interstate commerce in commodities and articles produced
or manufactured by industrial activities in which persons
were employed for more than five days per week or six hours
per day.

Black attacked the cotton textile industry for

5 5 to 6 0 hour work weeks and 1 1 to 1 2 hour night shifts ;

the woolen industry for 5 0 to 6 7 hour work weeks and 1 3
hour night shiftsj the lumber industry for 5 6 hour work
weeks and the silk and rayon industries for 6 0 hour work
weeks and 12 to 13 hour night shifts.
despite increased hourly demands,
decreased.

He complained that

industrial wages had

As the result of pressure from a group of

southern Senators led by "Cotton Ed" Smith of South
Carolina, B l a c k ’s bill was tabled to be taken up later.21
B l a c k ’s bill came to the Senate floor again in April,

1933,

and a watered-down version was passed by the Senate.

The

opponents of the bill were successful in having it only
specify a five-day work week, and hour and wages standards
were left to industrial management.

Most of the previous

2lCongressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Second Congress of the United
States of A m T r F c ^ ~~~7oT~. 76 ^ B a r t ^ ~ ~ D e o e m b e r 5-30» 1932
(Washington 5 D. C ., 1932) 820, and Congressiona1 R e c o r d :
Proceedings and Debates of the Second Session of the SeventyThird Congress of the United States of A m e r i c a , Vol.
Part 4, February 6-20, 1933 (Washington]! D^ cT, 1933)

4304 -4312 .

opponents of the bill, including Smith, voted for the
passage of the watered down version.22
In May, 1933 a bill came before the Senate to initiate
the taxation of privately owned electric power companies,
and with the help of southern opposition the bill was
defeated.
TABLE 4
EOLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A PROPOSED
BILL TO INITIATE THE TAXATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED
ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES
Yea
Bankhead
Black
Caraway
George
Long
Neely
Reynolds
Russell
Sheppard
Trammell

Nay
Bailey
Barkley
Byrd
Byrnes
Hatfield
Logan
Robinson
Stephens

Not Voting
Glass
MeKeliar
Smith
Thomas

The bill was reconsidered after an amendment was added
specifying a flat three percent tax on privately owned
electric power companies, and again the bill was rejected.
^ Congressional Record:
Proceedings and Debates of
the First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the
United States~~of~ America^ V o T T 7 7 ””- Part ITT^lpri 1^4^24’,
1933 (Washington, U. C., 1933) 1350.
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On this occasion, the southern Senators voted the same as
before except Senator Smith voted nay instead of abstaining.^3
In February, 1934 an amendment was proposed to the
Civil Works Administration Act which provided for
presidential appointment of the state directors of the
C. W. A.

State directors controlled the disbursement of

Federal funds to local agencies, and despite strong southern
opposition, the amendment was passed.
TABLE 5
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT'TO THE CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION ACT
PROVIDING FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTORS
Yea
Bailey
Black
Long
Neely
Reynolds
Russell
Smith
Trammell

Nay
Bankhead
Barkley
Byrnes
Connally
Harrison
MeKeliar
Robinson
Sheppard

Not Voting
Byrd
Caraway
George
Glass
Hatfield
Logan
Stephens
T h o m a s 24

In May, 1934 a bill came before the Senate which
provided for direct Federal control of corporate bankruptcy
proceedings.

Southern Senators overwhelmingly opposed the

successful Corporate Bankruptcy Act of 1934.
23Congressional Record?
Proceedings and Debates of the
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
Stat¥s~^of'America, VoTl 77 - Part 2, April 4-24, 1933
(Washington, D. C., 1933) 3240.
24g or)gresslonal Record:
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
States^of” Ame r i c a , VolZ 7& - Part SI May 3-20, 1934
(Washington, D. C., 1934) 8082.
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TABLE 6
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON
THE CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 193^
Yea

Nay

Thomas

Bankhead
Black
Byrnes
Connally
Lons
MeKeliar
Neely
Reynolds
Robinson
Russell
Sheppard
Stephens25

In January,

Not Voting;
Bailey
Barkley
Byrd
Caraway

G eorge
Glass
Harrison
Hatfield
Logan

1938 a bill was presented to the Senate

providing for the punishment of persons involved in
lynchings and instituting measures to deter future
lynchings.

In order to prevent the passage of the bill,

southern Senators began a lengthy filibuster*

In late

January and early February two roll call votes were taken
in order to invoke cloture and to force the bill to a vote,
and in both instances, the southerners overwhelmingly
opposed cloture.

The filibuster successfully concluded when

the bill was tabled in February, 1938.
25Congressional Record s Proceedings and Debates
of the Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of
the Uni ted “"states of' A m erica, ~Vol« ?8 « Part 87 May 3-20.
(Washington, D. C., 193^) 8082.

19’

6b

TABLE 7
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE MOTION
TO ENFORCE CLOTURE OF DEBATE ON THE ANTI-LYNCHING
BILL OF 1938*
Yea
Barkley
Logan
Neely

Nay
Bailey
Bankhead
Bilbo
Byrd
Byrnes
Caraway
Connolly
Ellender
George
Glass
Harrison
Hill
Holt
MeKeliar
Overton
Pepper
Reynolds
Russell
Sheppard

Smith26

*The motion for cloture was proposed in
January and February, 1938, and in both
instances the southern votes were the same.
In June,

1938 a bill providing for Federal regulation

of privately owned utilities was passed by the Senate.
Southern opposition was clearly recorded by the voting.
26c ongressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United
States of America, Vol. S3 - Part 1, January 3-2?, 1938
{Washington, D. C ., 1938) 1 1 6 6 and Congressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the Third Session of the SeventyFifth Congress of the United States of A m erica, Vol. 53 Part 2, January 28 to February 23, 193 8 (Washington, D. C .,

1938 ) 200?.

TABLE 8
BOLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE
BILL PROVIDING FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF
PRIVATELY OWNED UTILITIES
Yea
Bailey
Bankhead
Byrd
Caraway

Not Voting

Nay

Glass
Karr i s on
Reynolds

Bilbo
Rvrrigs

Connally
Ellender
George
Hill
Holt
Logan
McKellar
Neely
Overton
Pepper
Russell
Sheppard
Smith27

In an attempt to curb Congressional opposition,
Roosevelt campaigned against the renomination of a number of
key anti-New Deal southerners and thereby he sought to "purge”
and liberalize the Democratic party.

He opposed Senator

Smith of South Carolina, Senator George of Georgia and
Senator Tydings of the border state of Maryland, as well as
three deep southern congressmen.

Roosevelt failed, and all

of the anti-New Deal southerners were renominated and
re-elected.

This tactic embittered the southern delegates,

2 7Congressiona1 Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United
States of America, Vol. 83 - Part 7, May 20 to June 7, 1938
"(Washington, D. C., 1938) 795^*
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and caused them to oppose New Deal legislation more
vigorously, particularly in the Senate.
In June, 19^2 an appropriations bill for the Civilian
Conservation Corps came before the Senate.

On two occasions

the majority of southern Senators voted to discontinue funding
the C. C. C.

Both votes resulted in ties between the yeas

and nays on the Senate floor, and in each instance, Vice
President Henry Wallace, the President of the Senate, broke
the tie in favor of the C. C. C.
TABLE 9
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON BILL
TO CONTINUE FUNDING THE C. C. C.*
Yea
Bilbo
Doxey
Ellender
Hill
Kilgore
Pepper
Russell
Rosier

Nay
Bailey
Bankhead
Byrd
Connally
George
MeKeliar
Maybank
Smith^9

Not Voting
Barkley
Caraway
Glass
O*Daniel
Overton

■*The bill was voted on twice, once to amend
it and once for passage, and the southerners
voted the same way both times.
28^[ario Einaudi, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York,
1959) 9°“’92? Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin
Roosevelt (Chicago, 1957) 6 8 -6 9 T Rexford^Tugwell, The Art of
Politicss
As Practiced by Three Great American;
Franklin
Roosevelt, Munzo Karin, and Florella La Guardia (New~York,
1*95?1 ^76*4'7b'l James
B u r n s The Deadlock of Democracy:
Four Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, 1 9 6 3 ) 1 6 3 ?
John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect (Garden City, 1950) 297?
and Key, Southern Politics, 36T~and 375.
29Congressional Record?
Proceedings and Debates of the
Seventy“Seventh Congress of the U n ited States of America,
Vol. 88 - Part 4, May 25 to June 30, 19^2 (Washington, D. C . ,
19^2) 5612 and 5613.
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In November, 19^2 an anti-poll tax bill was introduced
in the Senate, and in order to prevent its possible passage,
a group of southern Senators initiated a filibuster.

On

November 2 3 a vote to enforce cloture failed to end debate,
and the bill was tabled.

Southern Senators clearly voted

against cloture and against the elimination of the poll tax*
TABLE 10
ROLL GALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON MOTION TO
ENFORCE CLOTURE OF DEBATE ON ANTI-POLL TAX BILL
OF 19^2
Yea
Barkley
Kilgore
Pepper
Thomas

Not Voting
Bailey
Bankhead
Bilbo
Byrd
Caraway
Gonnally
Doxey
Ellender
George
Hill
MeKeliar
Maybank
0 'Daniel
Overton
Russell
Smith -?0

Glass
Reynolds

Throughout the New Deal numerous bills were passed to
provide relief for the gravely depressed agricultural com
munity,

Despite the severe plight of southern farmers, their

Congressional representatives voted against many measures
3QCongressional Records
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United
States of America^ Vol. 5 & - LPart 7* October 20 to
DecemberTuTT~T9^2 (Washington, D. C., 19^+2) 9065»

proposed to aid farming.31

In April, 1933 the majority of

southern Senators voted against the Farm Relief Act because
it set fixed agricultural prices,

Despite their opposition,

the bill was enacted.
TABLE 11
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON THE FARM
RELIEF ACT OF 1933
Yea
Caraway
Hatfield
Long
Neely
Reynolds
Russell
Smith
Thomas

Nay

Not Voting

Bailey
Barkley
Black
Byrd
Byrnes
Connally
George
Glass
MeKeliar
Robinson
Sheppard
Stephens
Trammell
Tydings32

Bankhead

In June, 1938 an amendment to the Federal Surplus
Commodities Corporation Act providing the Corporation with
5 0 million dollars for the direct purchase of agricultural

commodities at fixed prices was passed by the Senate.

In

spite of the fact that this bill would disburse badly needed
capital into agriculture,

southern Senators opposed its

passage.
3lFor material indicative of the severe plight of
southern farmers see footnote A in Chapter I.
32congresslonal Record s Proceedings and Debates of the
First Sessi on ol the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
Statei^of^America, VolT T7 ~- Partf 2, A
, l93T~
"[Washington, D. C •, 1933) 1637*
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TABLE 12
ROLL CALL VOTE OP SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A N AMENDMENT
TO THE FEDERAL SURPLUS COMMODITIES CORPORATION ACT
TO PROVIDE DIRECT PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES AT FIXED PRICES
Yea
Bailey
Bankhead
Bilbo
Connally
Harrison
Hill
Holt
Pepper

Not Voting
Byrd
Byrnes
Caraway
George
Glass
Reynolds
Smith
Thomas
Tydings33

Ellender
Barkley
Logan
MeKeliar
Neely
Overton
Russell
Sheppard

The goal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was to
achieve parity in farm prices by government purchase of
agricultural commodities, crop limitation and Federal farm
loans.

In August, 19^2 the Senate voted to continue Federal

loans to farmers growing and limiting certain commodities
such as wheat and cotton.

The southern Senators split on

this question.
TABLE 13
ROLL CALL VOTE OF SOUTHERN SENATORS ON A
MOTION TO CONTINUE FARM LOANS UNDER THE
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
Yea
Bankhead
Barkley
Bilbo

Nay
Bailey
Byrd
Kilgore

Not Voting
Doxey
George
Glass

33congresslonal Record ; Proceedings and Debates of the
Third Session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United
States of America, Vol. 83 - Part 7* May 20 to June 7* 1933
T ^ s h i n g t o n , D. G., 1933) 8103.
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0*Daniel
Overton
Hosier
Smith

Caraway
Ellender
MeKeliar
Maybank
Pepper
Reynolds
Russell3^

Feuding developed between southern and non-southern
Democratic senators as the New Deal became more and more
effective*

In 1936 Senator Robert LaFollette*s Committee on

Labor began investigating charges of unfair labor practices
and abuses of civil rights by i n d u s t r y . 35

LaFollette was

opposed by a group of southern Senators led by Jimmy Byrnes
of South Carolina.

Byrnes had clearly demonstrated an anti

labor position when he sought to amend the right to strike
provisions of the Guffey-Vinson Bill because he asserted that
such a right was *’illegal and contrary to sound public
policy” , and as the Chairman of the powerful Senate Committee
to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate,
3^Congressional Record:
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United
States' of America, Vol. 88 - Part 5# July 1 to September 1^,
19^2 (Washington, D. C . , 19^2) 6Q2A.
Also see. Burns, op.
c i t e, 1 6 3 ; Schlesinger 9 The Politics of Upheaval, 515-517;
Binaudi, op. c it.s 90-92; PerkinsJ op. cit., 5B” 6 9 ; Tugwell,
op. c i t., 4 7 6 -^ 7 8 ; and Key, Southern Politics, 369-378, for
accounts of similar opposition by southern members of the
House of Representatives.
Legislation cited includes wage
and hour controls, Federal regulation of tideland oil reserves
and mineral deposits, social security, banking regulations,
anti-lynching laws, voter registration regulations and
Federal control of farm crops and prices.
35The LaFollette investigations resulted from abuses of
the Wagner Act which created the National Labor Relations
Board, provided for collective bargaining, and forbade
discrimination against unions or union labor.

Byrnes moved to discontinue funding the LaFollette
Committee in order to stop the investigations.

He was

supported on the Committee by “Cotton E d ” Smith and Millard
Tydings.

The only thing that prevented Byrnes from cutting

off LaFollette*s funds was direct presidential-intervention.
On July 26, 1939 Roosevelt sent a letter to Byrnes requesting
that he not limit LaFollette’s budget.

In spite of F. D. R. *s

endorsement of the labor investigations, Senator Smith con
tinued to oppose LaFollette*s Committee, and he warned the
Senate against state socialism and encroaching Federal
power.

As a result of his committee*s probes, LaFollette

introduced legislation to prohibit oppressive labor practices
and anti-union regulations.

LaFollette *s previous opponents

were then joined by Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina,
“Happy” Chandler of Kentucky, and Robert Reynolds of North
Carolina.

Reynolds successfully amended LaFollette1s bill

and transformed it into a national defense measure excluding
the employment of aliens, Communists

and

Nazis.

36

Senator George of Georgia opposed the Fair Employment
Practices Commission, and in 19^3 be introduced an amendment
to limit the Commission’s funds.

With support from Senator

Russell and a group of Republican switchers, George’s
amendment was accepted.37

These are only two examples of the

36jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and L iberty: The LaFollette
Committee and the New Deal ^Indianapolis, 1 9 6 6 ) 114-115, 73,
158, 171-172, 1737“and 198-199.
37Drury, op. cit.,

1 2 2 and 1 9 6 .
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feuding which developed in Congress as a result of the
implementation of New Deal

legislation.

38

The New Deal fostered greater Federal control of the
economic and social character of the South, and the data
indicates that southern Democrats opposed legislation which
instituted direct Federal Interventi on m t kj matters
previously controlled by southerners.

The data also indicates

that in most instances the southern Democrats were tmsuccessful in stopping the expansion of Federal power.

The southern

Democrats were intent upon maintaining political power in the
South, and opposition to the New Deal In Congress and to
Roosevelt in presidential politics was the result.

In 194A

pro-New Deal Senator Claude Pepper of Florida and anti-New
Deal Senator George of Georgia both agreed that the
objective of southern Democrats was to preserve the political
influence of the South.39
In many instances, the anti-New Deal southern Democrats
were from black belt regions of the Deep South, and in local
southern politics, they were members of the conservative,
“big mule” , planter, black belt faction.
By opposing the Bank Act of 1933# Senators Connally,
Sheppard, Bankhead, Broussard and Cohen were seeking to
prevent Federal control of bank funds for speculation.

All

38Drury *s A Senate Journal is filled with accounts and
highlights of similar disputes.
This is also true of
A u e r b a c h ’s work.
39Drury, op. cit., 208.
Drury reported this informa
tion as the result of separate Interviews.
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of these Senators represented industrial areas of the black
belt regions dependent upon speculative and available
money.The

overwhelming opposition to fixed agricultural

prices reflected the interests of the large black belt
planters, and black belt Senators led these f i g h t s . B y
opposing federally appointed administrators for state and
local projects such as the Civil Works Administration and
Federal control of corporate bankruptcy, black belt
southern legislators directly demonstrated their desire to
maintain southern political control . ^ 2

By opposing the

Fair Employment Practices Commission and the National Labor
Relations Board for enforcing equal employment opportunities,
by upholding the poll tax, and by defeating anti-lynching
laws, black belt southern Democrats demonstrated their
^Oconnally was from Marlin, Texas, and Sheppard was from
Texarkana, Texas.
Both are black belt cities in the Texas
oil region*
Broussard was from the mineral rich southern
Louisiana black belt {New Iberia), Bankhead represented the
Alabama black belt with Birmingham*s coal and iron center,
and Cohen was from Georgia*s industrial center, Atlanta.
^ S e n a t o r Russell, from Widner, Georgia, opposed this
type of legislation as did fellow black belt Senators
Overton (Alexandria, Louisiana), Smith (of South Carolina),
MeKeliar (Memphis, Tennessee), George (Vienna, Georgia),
Byrnes (South Carolina), Bailey (North Carolina), Connally
and Sheppard (Texas), Bankhead (Alabama), and Stephens
(Mississippi).
All of the legislators were strong in the
black belt regions of their home states.
^ 2The Civil Works Administration Bill and the Corporate
Bankruptcy Act were opposed by black belt Senators George,
Logan, Stephens, Bankhead, Byrnes, Connally, MeKeliar,
Sheppard, Bailey and Russell.

desire to maintain white supremacy.^3
wage and hour regulations,

By opposing Federal

black belt southern Democrats

demonstrated a concern with preserving at least one of the
significant advantages of southern industry, namely,
wages for longer hours.^

lower

Throughout the New Deal,

conservative black belt southern Democrats opposed legisla
tion designed to take control of the South out of the hands
of the southerners.^5

Also indicative of this is the fact

that conservative black belt southern Democrats supported
New Deal legislation which strengthened southern influence
and control.
The black belt southern Democrats supported numerous
bills and motions which provided relief for agricultural
interests without direct Federal intervention.

The 1933

^3senators Smith, Eastland, George, and Russell were
consistent opponents of equal labor opportunities.
The
only black belt Senator to favor Federal lynching laws was
Logan, and no southern Senator favored anti-poll tax
legislation.
^ S e n a t o r s Byrnes, Smith, Chandler, Bailey, Reynolds,
Stephens, George, Russell, and Eastland opposed legislation
designed to regulate labor standards, wages and hours.
Within their districts were located many of the southern
Industrial interests such as textiles (North Carolina, South
Carolina), steel and coal mining (Alabama), and lumbering
(Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi).
*t5For example, in 1933 » 1933 , and 19^*^ black belt
Senators opposed Federal regulation of privately owned
utilities.
Participating in this opposition were Senators
Bailey, Byrnes, Logan, Stephens, Connally, Ellender, George,
McKellar, Overton, Russell, Sheppard, and Smith.
In the
South, most utility companies were privately owned.
See,
The Blue Book of Southern Progress, 10 , 17 , 18 , 33«
(These
pages show advertisements for privately owned utilities.)
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Relief of Agriculture Bill was passed by the Senate, following
House approval, and was supported by anti-New Dealers such as
Bankhead, Byrnes, Connally, George, Reynolds, Russell,
Sheppard, and Stevens . ^6

In 193^ a farm bill came into the

Senate which proposed to place the cotton market on a sound
commercial basis.

The bill was defeated in the Senate

despite the support of eleven black belt Democrats.^7
Also, in 193^ the same bloc of southern Democrats supported
the Farm Bankruptcy Act which allowed farmers to file for
bankruptcy through the courts in the same manner as corporate
business interests.

This measure allowed farmers to liqui

date their liabilities and keep their l a n d . ^

In 19^2 the

black belt southern Democrats unanimously supported a bill
that stated fixed prices but specified that no maximum
prices would be established or maintained for any agricul
tural commodity.^9

in 1 9 ^ Bankhead and Eastland introduced

^ Congressional Records
Proceedings and Debates of the
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
States oT^America, V 6 iT" 7 7
Part 3 9 ApriT~°2 j to May 11,
1933 (Washington, D. C ., 1933) 2562.
^ Congressional Records
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
States of A merica, Vol. 78 - P a r t 6 , March 28 to April 17/
1 9 3 7 (Washington, D. C •, 193^) 5712.
^ Congressional Record:
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
S t a b ^ ^ ^ f ^ A m e r i c a , Vol 7 7^ - Part 11, June 14-18, 193^
(Washington, D. C ., 193^) 12381.
^ Congressional Records
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United
States "oFllmerica, VoTT 8 8 ' - Part l,~~^January3^ 19^2 to
February 197 19^2 (Washington, D. C ., 19^2) 2A2.

and debated an amendment to exempt the price of cotton from
the control of the Office of Price Administration.50
In relation to industrial recovery, the black belt
Democrats were consistent in that they supported legislation
providing southern interests with relief without encumbrance.
Black belt Democrats overwhelmingly supported the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933*

Tbe bill proposed to foster

recovery by supporting the construction of public works
dictated by local needs.51

in March, 193^ nearly all of the

black belt Democrats supported a bill to include cattle as a
basic industry, and thereby make the cattle industry eligible
for reliefv" Agricultural diversification had fostered a
growing and important cattle industry in the southern black
belts.52

xn 1975 black belt Democrats, particularly those

from mineral rich
areas, favored a resolution to reduce taxes
1
on the expenses of intangible drilling and development
costs.53

Southern reaction to the New Deal was determined

50Drury,

op. cit., 190.

5 lcongressional Record;
Proceedings and Debates of the
First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
States of AmericaT"V o l » 77 - Part 6 , June B^l5, 1933
™
(Washington, D. C«, 1933) 5^02.
52gongressional Records
Proceedings and Debates of the
Second Session of the Seventy-Third Congress of the United
7tates~~ofTlraer ica , Vol. 78~ - Part A, March 1-1^, 1937
(Washington, D. C •, 193*0 *H51*
53united States of America Congressional Rec o r d :
Proceedings and Debate of the First Session of the SeventyNinth Congress , Vol. 91 - Part 6 , July 2 to September 10,
19737[washing t on , D. C., 1975) 7&91*

by an insistence that the local establishment should
control local affairs.
In the South the policies of the New Deal alienated
much of the white population of the black belt agrarian
areas against the national Democratic party.

Black belt

planters felt oppressed by Federal regulations which
required them to plow under nearly mature cotton plants, and
the New Deal inspired destruction of the tenant farming
system, causing tenant farmers, as well as their landlords,
to lose their farms,57

Such consequences of the New Deal

precipitated enduring animosity in areas of the South
represented by local conservative leaders such as Gessner
T* McCorvey, the Alabama leader of the black belt and the
“Big Mules” , Horace Wilkinson, a Birmingham attorney,

judge

and close friend of McCorvey, and Fielding Wright, the
Governor of Mississippi.55
Southern industry was becoming nationally competitive
during the New Deal Era, and a significant amount of resent
ment was harbored against the “northern interests” for
supposedly inhibiting southern industrial development and
57j. B. Shannon, “Presidential Politics in the South” ,
Journal of Politics, August, 1948, 489; Molyneaux, op. cit.,
100-102? Powell and Cutler, op. cit., 308-318; Jessee F.
Sprague, “What *s Doing in Businesss
The Cotton Country” ,
Saturday Evening Post (August 11, 1934) 23-30; S. K.
Badcliff, “The Changing American South”, Contemporary
Review (July, 1937) 30-38.
55Key, Southern Politics, 245.
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competition.

Frank Freidel, a noted Roosevelt biographer,

estimated that seventy percent of the southern industrial
interests opposed the regulatory policies of the New Deal,
particularly the control of wages and hours.

Since a signi

ficant number of southern industries were located in the
Deep South, and since this region usually represented
conservative attitudes, Freidel*s estimation is probably
close to being correct.

The fact that anti-New Dealism

existed among southern businessmen in light of the regulatory
policies which the New Deal imposed,

is not surprising.

Prominent anti-New Deal businessmen included John U. Barr
and Leander Perez of Louisiana and “Business B e n ” Laney, the
former governor of

Arkansas.

Throughout the South,

56

local Democratic spokesmen

clearly opposed what they considered the encroaching social
and economic powers of the New Deal,

Among these spokesmen

were Sam Jones, the Governor of Louisiana, Frank Dixon, the
Governor of Alabama, Frank Upchurch, a Democratic committee
man from Florida and opponent of Florida’s New Deal Senator,
Claude Pepper,

Merritt Gibson, the leader of the Texas

56Freidel, op. cit., 95» E. B. A d e r , The Dixiecrat
Movement (Berkeley, 1951)* A n Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertations
The University of California, 126? Jonathan
Daniels, “Democracy is Bread”, Virginia Quarterly Review
(Autumn, 1938) 481-490; Schlesinger, Coming of the New D e a l ,
504; and Key, Southern Politics, 9 6 , 2 3 6 , and 256. ~ —
*
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Regulars, and Mississippi’s Delta spokesman, Senator
James Eastland.57
Despite conservative southern Democratic opposition
within the ranks of the Democratic party, in Congress and in
the South, important New Deal legislation was proposed and
approved by Congress,

After 1938 the New Deal gradually

began to function in the South, and the positions of conser
vative southern Democratic leaders were weakened.
After Roosevelt’s death, President Truman proposed a
legislative program, the Pair Deal, which attempted to con
tinue the New Deal in its social and economic programs,
Truman supported compulsory health insurance, an enlarged
farm program, a broader civil rights program, and Federal
aid to education.

Temporarily, the Fair Deal was stalled,

but as.Truman, applied pressure conservative southern
Democratic opposition became increasingly less effective in
Congress.
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under T r u m a n ’s legislative leadership, there

was little expectation that significant changes in the
social and economic policies of the national Democratic
party would occur.
57Sam Jones (as told to James Aswe11), “Will Dixie
Bolt the New Deal” , Saturday Evening Post (March 6 , 1943)
20 and 42-45; Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 85; Fuller,
“The New Confederacy”, 11-12 $ and Key, Southern Politics,
9 6 , 2 3 6 and 2 5 6 .
58Roseboom, op. cit., 493? Burns,
Key, Southern Politics, 3 6 0 - 3 6 6 ,

op. cit., 313; and
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In 19^8 the prospects for Truman being elected
President were not encouraging, and in the early summer of
19^8, a "Dump Truman” movement developed which sought to
replace Truman with Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Democratic
candidate for president.

Conservative southern Democrats

were prominent in this movement which failed when Eisenhower
refused to consider the Democratic draft.59

Having been

unsuccessful in replacing Truman, conservative southern
leaders became more dissatisfied and rumors of a southern
bo3.t increased . 8 0
At the outset of the 19^8 Democratic National Convention,
Truman's nomination was almost certain, but regardless,
conservative southerners opposed him.

Southern delegates,

probably in an attempt to strengthen their bargaining
position,

supported Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, and

cast 263 votes against the successful Truman.

Although

Alben Barkley of Kentucky was selected as the vice
presidential nominee, and conservative southerners accepted
this nomination, they could hardly claim to have participated
59Roseboom, op, cit., 498™^99» Eaton, op. cit., ^26^27; Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York,1959)
72-87.
Thurmond, Laney, Tuck and Byrd of Virginia, Hill of
Alabama, and Jester of Texas supported the "Dump Truman”
movement.
T r u m a n Withdrawal Urged by Thurmond” , New York Times
(July 10, 19^8) 7; Roseboom, op. cit., 4-99; and- Eaton, op.
cit., 427,
Thurmond stated that he favored a Democratic
victory but Truman could not achieve this since he had
alienated the South with his civil rights demands.
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in his selection.

Southern Democrats sought the restoration

of the two-thirds rule and were again defeated.

They were

unable to Influence the composition of the Party's platform,
and proposals for clarification and moderation of the civil
rights plank were rejected.

Conservative southern Democrats

were again powerless to influence or control the politics
and policies of the national Democratic party, and as a result,
many bolted the 1948 Convention.
Prior to the bolt, Ben Laney of Arkansas and Fielding
Wright of Mississippi had arranged for a rump convention to be
held in Birmingham, Alabama, two days after the walkout.
On July 17, 1948 dissident conservative southern Democrats
began to assemble .in Birmingham, and on July 18 and 19 they
held a "conference” , "recommended” Governors J. Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina and Fielding Wright of Mississippi
as candidates for President and Vice President, and they
launched the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8.

Delegates to this

so-called "conference” included conservative southern
Democrats who had bolted the National Democratic Convention,
and conservative southern Democrats who had been active
8 l«southerners Fail To Get Candidate To Contest Truman
On Rights", New York Times (July 12, 1948) 1; "Mississippi
Group Seated After R o w ”, New York Times (July 14, 1948) 4;
Abels, op. cit., 8 9 , 91-92 and 93? Roseboom, op. cit., 499?
and Eaton, op. cit., 429 and 430,
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opponents of the New Deal both on the national and local
levels
Characteristically, Dixiecrats were white anti-New
Deal black belt conservative Democrats who represented the
economic, social and political interests of the planter,
"Big Mule", local conservative southern faction,
was a prominent Louisiana Dixiecrat.
Louisiana,

8 am Jones

As Governor of

he had been an outspoken opponent of New Deal

Intervention in local southern politics.^3

Frank Dixon was

a former conservative Governor of Alabama, a close associate
of Jones, and an anti-New Dealer.
leader of the Alabama Dixiecrats . ^

In 19^8 he became the
John U. Barr, a

prominent and wealthy New Orleans rope manufacturer, was
ardently anti-New Deal, and in 1 9 ^

he led the unsuccessful

62Among those present at the Birmingham ^conference'1
were Hardy Ellis, Fielding Wright, Marlon Rushton, Strom
Thurmond, Senator Eastland, "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, Gessner
T. McGorvey, Horace Wilkinson and Gerald L. K. Smith, see
Abels, op. cit., 97? "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate to
Contest Truman on Rights", New York Times (July 12, 19^8) 1;
"Texas Unit Fights Bolt from Truman", New York
Times
(July 13, 19^3) 1? "Truman Shunned by Votes of South", New
York Times (July 15, 19^8) 1? "Southerners Plan to Fight
Truman on Electoral Vote", New York Times (July 17, 19^8) 1?
"Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate", New York Times
(July 18, 19^8) 3.
63jones, op. cit., 20-21; Key, Southern Politics, 16^,
17^, 178 and 3^1? A d e r , The Dixiecrat Movement, 100?and
Heard, A Two Party South? , 25.
6^jones, op. cit., 21? "Southerners Pick Laney", New
York Times (July 25, 19^8) 6? Key, Southern Politics, .3O'™
arid 6 3 4 ? Heard, A Two Party South?,”"26-27, and I59~l80?
and Helen Fuller, "The New Confederacy", New Republic
(December, 19^8) 12-13.
Fuller stated that Dixon, as a
lawyer, represented the Associated Industries of Alabama,
The National Association of Manufacturers, and the Alabama
Power Co.
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Byrd-for-President movement.

In 19^8 Barr was a Dixiecrat.85

Leander Perez was the undisputed financial and political boss
of Louisiana.

Perez had bitterly opposed the New Deal,

particularly the regulation of natural resources, and he had
actively opposed Roosevelt.

In 1948 Perez became a Dixie

crat, and primarily due to his influence, Louisiana Democrats
adopted Thurmond and Wright as their official candidates . 8 6
Merritt Gibson had been the campaign manager of the antiNew Deal Texas Regulars third party movement of 1944? and
in 1948 he was the national campaign manager of the Dixiecrat
Movement. 8 ?

"Business Ben" Laney was a conservative

businessman, political leader, and a former Governor of
Arkansas.

He was a long-time associate of the anti-New Deal

Arkansas Free Enterprise Association; and in 1948 he served
as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dixiecrat
Movement . 8 8

Gerald L. K. Smith, a racist, conservative

southern Democratic leader, had actively supported Gene
Talmadge and the anti-New Deal "Jeffersonian Democrats" and
the Lemke-for-President movement in 1936.

In 19^8 he became

65Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 142? Key, Southern
Politics, 3^1] "Report from the South", New York Times
(July 25, 19^8) 6 .
6 6 sherrill,

op. cit.,

7*

6 7Heard, A Two Party South?, 65, 114, and 258-261; A d e r ,
The Dixiecrat Movement, 81; "Southerners Pick Laney", 6 ;
and Key, Southern Politics, 256-258.
6 8 A b e X s , op. cit., 11, 19, 74, and 89; "Southerners Pick
Laney", 6 ; Heard, A Two Party South?, 164, 261 and 297; and
Key, Southern Politics, 19 8 -199, 333» and 339*

a Dixiecrat.

Gessner T. McCorvey, the loquacious leader

of the Alabama black belt and the Industrial "Big Mules *1f
had been an ardent opponent of the New Deal, and in 19^8 he
became a leading Alabama Dixiecrat.70

Horace Wilkinson, a

McCorvey cohort, was an influential, anti-New Deal black
belt attorney and judge.

In 19^8 Wilkinson was a Dixiecrat

candidate for presidential elector from Alabama and also a
Dixiecrat spokesman.71

Frank Upchurch, a leading Florida

conservative Democrat and a member of Florida*s Democratic
Committee, had been an ardent opponent of Florida*s
New Deal Senator Claude Pepper.

He had led the movement to

send unpledged delegates to the 1 9 ^ National Democratic
Convention in order to oppose Roosevelt.

In 19^8 Upchurch

became the leading Florida Dixiecrat and a member of the
Executive Committee of the Dixiecrat Movement.72

Senator

Walter F. George of Georgia had consistently opposed the New
Deal since the mid-1930*s; and in 1938 Roosevelt had attempted
69Abels, op. cit., 98 and 2 1 5 1 and Ader, The Dixiecrat
Movement, 95* Ader states that Smith was rejected by
Thurmond due to his racist statements.
7°The term "Big Mule*1, refers to southern industrial
interests.
Key, Southern Politics, 332, 3^2, and 632-633?
Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 123T and Fuller, "New
Fuller stated that McCorvey, as a
Confederacy", 11-12.
lawyer, represented Standard Oil, Humble Oil, Gulf Oil, and
Magnolia Petroleum and Tennessee Coal and Iron (U. S. Steel).
71"Rights Party Gains Mounting in South", New York Times
(September 12, 19^8) 3 6 ; Heard, A Two Party South?, 28 and
283 s Key, Southern Politics, 332, 33^ and "033 - 6 35 s. and Ader,
The Dixiecrat Movement, 125 •
72"Report from the South", 6 ; "Southerners Pick Laney",
6 s A d e r » The Dixiecrat Movement, 130-132? Key, Southern
Politics,~~96n and 33b; ITnTlIeard, A Two Party South?, 2 9 7 .

85
to "purge” him along with other southern opponents of the
New Deal.
crat. 73

In 19^8 George became a leading Georgia Dixie
In 1 9 ^ Dan Moody, a prominent conservative Texas

Democrat had been a Texas Regular, and in 19^8 he was a
Dixiecrat.7^

Palmer Bradley was a Houston lawyer

representing Standard Oil and Hughes Tool Company? and in
19^8 he was the first head of the Dixiecrat Movement in
T e x a s .
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Marion Rushton had been the Alabama delegate to

the National Democratic Convention appointed by the southern
caucus as chairman of a committee charged with finding a
candidate to oppose Truman.

He bolted the Convention with

the rest of the Alabama delegation, and subsequently became
the Chairman of the Alabama Dixiecrats.

Rushton, as a

lawyer, represented the Chase National Bank, the Buckeye
Cotton Oil Company and the Capital Fertilizer Company.76
Handy Ellis had been the unsuccessful conservative black
73Heard, A Two party South?, 159-16°» Abels, op. cit.,
25, 8 7 , 95, and 9 9 ? Lubell, op. cit., 3 2 and 3 5 s and
Sherrill, op. cit., W , and 62-6^.
7^Key, Southern Politics, 26ln, 268, and 601.
75Fuller, “The New Confederacy” , 12-13? and Heard, A
Two Party South?, 159-160.
76Ful3.er, "The New Confederacy” , 12-13? Heard, A Two
Party South?, 159-160? "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate
to Contest Truman on Rights” , 1? "Texas Unit Fights Bolt
from Truman” , New York Times (July 13, 19^8) 1.
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belt candidate for the governorship of Alabama in 19^8.
Ellis led the Alabama bolters from the National Democratic
Convention, attended the Birmingham ^conference” , and became
a leading Alabama Dixiecrat.78

Fielding Wright was a

Mississippi black belt conservative, an anti-New Deal
advocate and Governor of his state*

He led the bolting

Mississippians from the National Democratic Convention, and
at Birmingham he became the Dixiecrat candidate for vice
president.

Strom Thurmond did not bolt the National

Democratic Convention,

but he was present at Birmingham to

accept the Dixiecrat nomination for president.

Thurmond,

although considered a racial moderate according to southern
standards, was an unwavering white supremacist.

As Governor

of South Carolina, he had been anti-New Deal and inclined to
favor black belt i n t e r e s t s . 79

Senator James 0. Eastland,

the representative of Mississippifs black belt Delta region,
had often opposed New Deal legislation; and in 19^8 he
??Key, Southern Politics, 42-^3•
neo-populist “Big Jim" Folsom.

Ellis was defeated by

^ ^ s o u therners Fail to Get Candidate to Contest Truman
on Rights” , 1; “Texas Unit Fights Bolt from Truman”, 1;
“Truman Shunned by Votes of South”, 1; “Southerners Plan to
Fight Truman on Electoral V ote” , 1; and “Southerners Name
Anti-Truman Slate” , 3*
79“Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate*1, 3? and
Sherrill, op. cit., 246-249.

he was a leading Dixiecrat strategist and

spokesman.

80

“Alfalfa Bill” Murray had opposed Roosevelt*s presidential
nomination in 1932; and as the Governor of Oklahoma, he had
opposed the New Deal.

In 19^8 Murray attended the Birmingham

“conference” and became a Dixiecrat.81
The relationships between the regional strength, the
platform,

the campaign issues and the strategy of the Dixie

crat Movement and the characteristics of the black belt
regions presented in Chapters I and II become meaningful as
they are related to the evolution and objectives of the
Dixiecrat Movement.

The regional strength of the movement

was consistent with the black belt bailiwicks of most
Dixiecrat leaders; the platform articulated opposition to
the Democratic party for longstanding “abuses** of what the
Dixiecrats considered Democratic principles; the campaign
issues and policies of the movement further articulated
opposition to the Democratic party and sought to attract
voters and supporters by appealing to local prejudices and
economic interests; and the strategy was devised to achieve
the objectives of the movement by defeating Truman, by
splitting the Democratic party, and by leaving the
conservative southerners as a united and politically
Influential bloc.
80puiierf “New Confederacy*1, 1 3 - 1^1 “Southerners Plan
to Fight Truman on Electoral V ote”, 1; and Sherrill, op.
cit., 186, 1 8 7 - 1 8 8 , and 2 0 3 .
8 l»*southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate**, 3; and page 50
of this chapter.

Harold Lasswell stated that what men seek in political
negotiations Is political power and that political power is
measured according to the ability to influence the making of
d e c i s i o n s .

82

During the New Deal era, conservative southern

Democrats were usually unable to Influence the decision
making process of the De moo ra tic party, and as a result,
their efforts to maintain conservative southern political
poorer eventuated an intra-party feud.

The Democratic party

was split nationally into conservative and liberal, northern
and southern factions.

By 19^8 conservative southern

Democrats had become increasingly unable to influence the
decision-making process of the Democratic party; and as a
result,

legislation and policies which provided the Federal

government with increased authority to impose social,
economic and political regulations on the South were being
approved.

Frustrated by their inability to regain signifi

cant influence in their party by means of intra-party
politics, conservative southern Democrats sought their
objective by means of open conflict.

After the Civil Rights

Plank was approved by the National Democratic Convention, a
reporter in The New York Times stated,

“The South was

finished as an effective influence in shaping the work and
results of the

(Democratic) convention.“

Later at the

Birmingham "conference11, an unidentified official defiantly
82narold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York,
1 9 6 2 ) 2 3 3 and Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and
Politics (New York, 1930) 50.
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said that after Truman was defeated,

"we (the southern

Democrats) will be the dominant minority group and the
northern city machines will have to come to us for their
committee assignments."

When commenting on the rise of the

Dixiecrat Movement, Ben Laney stated,

"The purpose

(of the

movement) was not to bolt the Democratic party but to bring
that party more nearly under the direction of the South,"
Similarly, Fielding Wright told an audience in Jackson,
Mississippi, that,

"The strength shown by us tomorrow will

almost assuredly govern to a large extent our success four
years from now when we attempt to claim our rightful place
at the council table of our p a r t y , "^3

v . 0. Key stated that

third party movements often mirror the inner torments of a
major political party, and the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8
arose from such torment,^

8 3 "party to Fight on, Says Wright", New York Times
(November 2, 19^8) 3; "Southerners Fail to Get Candidate to
Contest Truman on Rights", 2; "Truman Shunned in Votes of
South", 1? "Southerners Name Anti-Truman Slate", 3? and V.
0, Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York,
1966) 280,
84Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups
280,

(1 9 6 6 ),

CHAPTER IV
SOME EFFECTS OF THE
DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT OF 19^8
It may be concluded that the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8
was the product of the frustration of a group of conservative
southern Democratic political leaders concerned about their
declining power within the Democratic party? their failure
to influence or control the policies regulating the develop
ment of the South; and their continued inability to revitalize
this diminished political power.

The Dixiecrat Movement of

1 9 ^ 8 was the culmination of at least sixteen years of

political conflict among Democrats.
Ostensibly, the results of the Dixiecrat Movement were
the electoral defeat of their candidates and the continued
failure of the conservative southern Democrats to regain a
leadership position in the Democratic party.

For this

reason, many Dixiecrats became further separated from their
objective and less able to participate smoothly or effective
ly in the political processes of the Democratic party.

Some

Dixiecrats were “purged" from the Democratic party and
others, possibly as an effort to maintain their local
political positions, switched to the Republican party.

The

Democratic National Committee barred Thurmond from any
leadership position in the Party, and in 195^ he campaigned
90

for the U. S. Senate as a Republican write-in candidate.
Other Democratic prodigals returned to the ranks of the
Party where they found their positive influence and control
of patronage damaged significantly.

In one such case,

Senator Eastland of Mississippi was ignored by the
Democratic Nat ional Committee when he sought patx'wnagt*, anm
former Dixiecrat Representatives from Mississippi and South
Carolina were relieved of the privilege of making appoint
ments *^

Instead of being a cohesive force in the South,

the Dixiecrats divided southern Democratic voters and
succeeded in winning electoral votes only in the Deep
Southern states.

These results are consistent with the

traditional fate of American third party movements, namely
failure,

^ an£ they do not indicate the effects which the

Dixiecrat Movement has produced in the South since 1948.
1 Marion Rushton of Alabama? J. B. Snider and Mrs. H.
Gauthier of South Carolina? W. H« Talbot of Louisiana; and
Mrs. A. Agnew of South Carolina were purged from the
Democratic party due to their Dixiecrat affiliation.
See,
Facts on File (Vol. 57» 1949) 2 75X; and Heard, op. cit.,
23-25.
^American third party movements usually function
exclusively on the national level and only endure one
election.
There have been exceptions, such as the
Socialists and Prohibitionists, but their followers have
remained small in number and their effect on the outcome
of presidential elections has been minimal.
See,
William B. Hesseltine, The Rise and Fall of Third Parties
(Gloucester, 1957) 18, 28, and 51? and Ostrogorski, op. cit,
xxxix and lx.
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In 1950 southern congressional elections were over
shadowed by bitter struggles excited by racial issues, and
several local southern progressives were defeated.3

E. B.

A d e r 1s conclusion that the defeat of the Dixiecrat Movement
marked the beginning of the liberalization of southern
politics was shown to be invalid by events which occurx*9 d
only two years after the movement failed.**'
In 1952 the national Democratic party In an effort to
avoid another southern bolt promised conservative southern
leaders a greater role in the p a rty’s politics.

This

maneuver may have been responsible for conservative southern
Democrats x'emalning nominally Democratic, but in the matter
of presidential voting, many Dixiecrat strongholds
supported Eisenhower and some conservative southern leaders
campaigned against Stevenson.5
3Among those defeated were Senators Frank P. Graham of
North Carolina and Claude Pepper of Florida.
See, Samuel
Lube11, op. c i t ., 107-117 for an account of these elections
and examples of the extreme racist positions assumed by
their opponents.
The precinct returns in these elections
evidenced a significant overlapping between Graham and
P e p p e r ’s opponents and the returns for Thurmond and Dewey in
1948.
**Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement, 105-110j and Ader,
the Dixiecrats Failed” , 390.

"Why

5Byrnes and Thurmond of South Carolina, Shivers of
Texas and Byrd of Virginia supported Eisenhower rather than
Stevenson, and Texas and Georgia anti-New Deal Democrats
voted Republican in 1952.
(These same areas had been
Dixiecrat strongholds in 19^3.)
See Burns, op. cit., 182185 and 1 9 6 ? Rossiter, op. cit., 90-94j Lube11, op. c i t .,
114 and 248 (Chart) j and Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups (1964), op. c i t •, 266.

In 195^ Thurmond, with the renewed support of James
Byrnes, became the first South Carolina u. S. Senator to be
elected by a write-in vote; and as a Senator, he has
developed an unyielding conservative attitude In matters of
national policy.

His continued electoral success provides

evidence that his approach to politics and policies is
extremely popular in the Deep South . 6
Also in 195^ Eastland, Thurmond, Wright, Sam Jones,
Herman Talmadge, John Bell Williams, L. Mendel Rivers,
William M. Tuck, Coke Stevenson, and John U. Barr met in
Memphis and formed the executive committee of a short
lived organization dedicated to fostering conservative
positions.

Later, this same group, led by Eastland,

established the segregationist White Citizens Council of
America.?
In 1956 in spite of efforts by the national
Democratic party to solidify their campaign in the South
behind Stevenson, Dixiecrat areas of the Deep South
6 sherrill,

op. cit., 241-249.

7Sherrill,

op. cit., 2 1 3 .

continued to support E i s e n h o w e r . &

in these elections the

lack of conservative southern support,

in the once "Solid

South", contributed significantly to successive Democratic
defeats in the 1 9 5 2 and 1 9 5 6 presidential elections.
The Democratic intra-party politics of i 9 6 0 seemed to
indicate that a breakthrough, in favor of the interests of
the southern Democrats, was beginning.

Although the

restoration of the two-thirds rule was rejected, a southerner
was selected and nominated to run for the vice presidency.
The candidate, Lyndon Johnson, was not a conservative 1 but
the South, with the exceptions of Florida, Virginia, and
Tennessee, the three southern states with the greatest
history of Republican competition, generally supported the
Kennedy-Johnson ticket.

However, i 9 6 0 also witnessed some

conservative opposition to the national Democratic party.
A Byrd-for-President movement formed in Mississippi and
Alabama, and this movement captured six of A l a b a m a ’s
electoral votes.

At the National Democratic Convention,

^The term "Presidential Republicanism" refers to this
voting behavior by Democrats who vote Democratic on the local
level and state level but Republican on the presidential
level.
In 1956 Presidential Republicanism was evident in
Florida, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Louisiana.
The extent of this voting pattern evident in other than
previously Dixiecrat areas is beyond the scope of this
essay, but the suggestion that voting coalitions developed
between previously Dixiecrat and non-Dixiecrat areas would
further indicate the effects of conservative entrenchment.
For evidence of Presidential Republicanism in previously
Dixiecrat areas see, Rossiter, op. cit., 94; Lubell, op.
cit., 248 (Chart); Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups (1 9 6 6 ), 266-267; and Burns, o p . cit., 185-186.

some southern states initially withheld delegates and
sought to leave their electors unassigned,

Dixiecrat-like

sentiments were not eliminated by Johnson*s candidacy, and
in i 9 6 0 some Deep Southern former Dixiecrat areas persisted
in Voting Republican,^
In 1 9 6 ^ conservative southern Democrats ignored the
fact that Johnson was an incumbent southern president, and
voted against him in an outburst of Dixiecrat sentiment.
Presidential Republicanism was evident in former Dixiecrat
areas of the South,10

This voting behavior may have been

influenced by the fact that conservative southern voters
found the Conservative Goldwater more appealing than
previous Republican candidates, but opposition to Johnson
may be clearly delineated also.

Politics, based on conflict

among Democrats, continued in the South.
The presidential politics of 1 9 6 8 again demonstrated
the continuing effect of the Dixiecrat Movement on southern
politics,

George Wallace, a third party candidate for

president, sought to force the presidential election before
the House of Representatives for resolution.

Wallace

disputed the policies of both the major parties, presented
radically conservative policies regarding race and law
9Rossiter, op, cit., 90; Burns,
and Lubell, op, cit., 2^8 (Chart).

op. cit., 315 and 272?

10ln 1 9 6 ^ Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama,
and South Carolina voted against Johnson.
See Lubell, op,
cit., 2^9 '(Chart).

enforcement, and was strongest in the former Deep Southern
bailiwick of the Dixiecrats.

Wallace differed from the

Dixiecrats in that he appeared on the ballot in every state
of the Union and he won a significant number of votes
outside the South, but Wallace and the Dixiecrats were each
concerned with exerting conservative strength in the South
and the nation.

Wallace’s tactics, strategy, and appeal

were influenced by the Dixiecrat Movement, and he built his
greatest following in the South among former Dixiecrat
voters.^

To state that it was Wallace1s intention to

build his party upon the Dixiecrat foundation would require
much evidence, but the fact that Wallace directed his appeal
to these.areas and they responded so clearly, would indicate
that this is a distinct possibility.
Recently, the Republican party in the South has
provided malcontent conservative southern Democrats with a
vehicle and a standard under which to oppose the politics
and policies of the national Democratic party,

Although

conservative southern Democrats are becoming nominal
Republicans, they are not changing their political disposi
tions.

A n attitude similar to this probably influenced

Harry Byrd, Jr., of Virginia to quit the Democratic party
and declare himself an independent.

Eventually, Byrd may

llWallace polled 691,425 votes in Alabama, 535,550
votes in Georgia, 530,300 votes in Louisiana, and 415,349 in
Mississippi winning a plurality in each state? and in
Texas, Florida, Tennessee, and South Carolina he ran second
to one of the major parties.

find a position as a Republican more convenient.

With the

Republican party courting the South by means of indifference
toward enforcement of Supreme Court decisions effecting
school desegregation, student busing, Federal aid to
education and standardized voting procedures, conservative
southern Democrats are finding or considering the Repu blx can
party to be a more efficient vehicle by which to oppose the
national Democratic party than another third party movement.
Former Dixiecrat areas such as the black belts of
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina,

Mississippi and Alabama

have developed into centers of overt southern racism and
anti-civil rights protest; and although this may not have
been exclusively a result of the Dixiecrat Movement of 1948,
the Dixiecrats were able to excite these sentiments and
present conservative positions by which such principles could
be further articulated.

The Dixiecrat8s rejection of liberal

attitudes engendered a rejection of the civl rights program
in the Deep South after November 2, 1948, but it would be
naive to propose that significant racism did not already
exist in the Deep South prior to the movement.

However,

the Dixiecrats did do much to provide the means for a
politically legitimate expression of such prejudice.

With

the rise of racial demagogues such as George Wallace and
Lester Maddox,

in former Dixiecrat areas, racial tensions

have been intensified and social development has been
inhibited.
controversy,

It may be argued that without unrest and
such demagogues would lose their appeal,
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influence, and local political power; and so, therefore,
racial a g i t a t i o n among excitable voters is their objective.
In relation to industry and labor, after 19^8
factories were closed and employees were terminated when
demands for unionization began; and racial Invectives were
directed towards blacks who sought industrial employment *
Business interests expanded local control and attempted to
discourage outside developers from entering southern
m a r k e t s *3.2

^s a result, southern industrial development

was inhibited, southern workers earned less money, worked
longer hours, and paid more for services than people in
other parts of the country#3-3

At least to a degree, these

results may be attributed to a Dixiecrat-like opposition to
non-southern regulation of southern interest.
The Dixiecrat Movement was the means by which a group
of conservative southern Democrats pursued their own selfinterest, and the continuation of these efforts since 1 9 ^ 8
has had a negative effect upon the development of the South.
In many ways, the Dixiecrat Movement contributed to the
inhibiting of the social, political and economic development
of the South, and such results are probably more significant
l^schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, 115-116;
and Sherrill, op. cit., 10 and 122-123.
13 Edna Cooper Flasuoka, “Motivation for Migration of
Southern-Born Notables”, Social Forces (Summer, 1951) 2 9 0 ;
C . Horace Mayo, Selz and Hamilton, “Current Population
Trends in the South” , Social Forces (Winter, 1 9 6 3 ) 77;
and Harry Estill Moore, “Mass Communication in the South”,
Social Forces (Fall, 1951) 365.
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than the third party movement itself.

The Dixiecrats

formulated and articulated the conservative southern posi
tion and the defeat of the movement was the beginning of the
entrenchment of that position in the Deep South against the
liberal policies and politics of the national Democratic
party.

Just as Populism provided the dominant theme of

southern politics at the beginning of the Twentieth Century,
so anti-New Dealism and the Dixiecrat Movement of 19^8 have
provided the political attitudes and positions of Conserva
tive southern politics in the mid and latter parts of the
Twentieth Century.

CHAPTER V
THE PLACE OF THE DIXIECRAT MOVEMENT IN
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF AMERICAN
THIRD PARTIES
Traditionally, American third parties have been over
whelmingly unsuccessful in regard to winning elections,
especially presidential elections.

The most significant

reason for the consistent failure of American third parties
has been the already noted American electoral system.

Since

this system functions to the advantage of a strong twoparty system, and since third parties have been consistently
unsuccessful within this system,

it may be concluded that

it functions to the disadvantage of third parties.

Due to

the lack of proportional representation and with simple
majority voting, there are no shared successes, and so,
third parties enjoy very little prospect of electoral
success.1

Additional factors may also be identified as

having contributed to the general inability of American
third parties to achieve electoral victories.

In general,

the major parties are politically moderate since under the
two party system electoral success is predicated by the
ability to deal with a multiplicity of interests.
3-Rossiter, op. cit., 10.
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However,
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third parties are usually able to deal only with the
limited interests of a geographic region or a particular
social or economic group; and therefore,
politically radical . 2

they become

In the United States, radical appeals

have caused a polarization of right and left wing third
parties; and since appeals to radicalism have generally gone
unheeded by the majority of Americans, the moderate center
has consistently constituted the successful major parties.
Clearly, radical polarization has worked to the disadvantage
of third parties.3

Also related to the two-party system is

the tendency of American voters to vote for one of the major
parties since such votes are believed to be of more effect
than votes for a third party.^

Voter inefficacy contributes

to the inability of a third party to defeat the second major
party on a sectional basis and thereby establish a
sectional stronghold from which to continue opposition.-5
2 Zucker, op. cit., 33«
(Although this is a book of
readings, these represent Zucker's oi<m comments.)

3Hossiter, op. cit., 8-9.
In 1948 this polarization
effect significantly assisted Truman's election.
The Dixie
crats polarized the right and Henry Wallace polarized the
left with the result that Truman became the "middle of the
roa d ” Democratic candidate,
Wallace was also successful in
cutting into Dewey's voter strength, again to Truman's
advantage.
See, Lubell, op. cit., 196-204- for a detailed
treatment of this aspect of the 1948 presidential election.
4 Ibid., 30; and V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and American
Democracy (New York, 196?) 193» 194-195, and 505-507.
5Rossiter, op. cit., 32-
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Financially, third parties have generally been unable to
acquire enough support to finance a national campaign, and
since most third parties function on the level of
presidential politics, the inability to pursue a truly
national campaign has severely limited the possibility of
third party success.

The major parties possess national

organizations and regional bases of strength; but in
general, third parties never develop independent national
organizations or lasting Independent geographic strongholds.
As a result, third parties often endure for one election
onl y . 6

Another cause for the relatively short duration of

most third parties is the fact that third parties raise
issues which once introduced force the major parties to
assume policy positions which negate the efforts of the
third parties.

As the major parties resolve the issues

raised by third party movements,
raison d'etre and disappear.7

the movements lose their

In some cases, third parties

endure but the actual percentage of votes acquired hardly
justify their continued existence.®
In many states, there are fees and legal difficulties
involved in getting a spot on the ballot, and such
6 Duverger, op, cit., 207; Hesseltine,
and Sorauf, op. cit., 34.

op. cit., 28;

7Rossiter, op. cit., 5 and 10; and Key, Politics,
Parties and Pressure Groups (1 9 6 6 ), 255*
®This is true of the Socialists and the Prohibitionists.
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hindrances have often prevented third parties from
participating in elections.9
It may be concluded that the atmosphere of American
politics has not been favorable for the development or
participation of third parties, but they have continued to
exist.

In an attempt to understand why these often quixotic

movements participate in American politics when their only
hope for victory is founded upon a tenuous hope that the
majority of voters will eventually recognize the inherent
value of their programs, Fred E. Haynes reasoned that by
bringing new issues before the voters and by agitating them
to a point where they would demand action, third parties
seek to force major parties into considering issues that
they would otherwise probably avoid.

He concluded that the

primary role of third parties was the education and agitation
of voters in order to indirectly achieve social and economic
reforms via the major parties.

In this manner, third

parties perform a valuable and unique function,3-0

and they

also prevent the two major parties from becoming
complacent due to their secure and unchallenged positions in
9Although less evident today, such restrictive
procedures do still exist,
George Wallace was able to get
on the ballot in all 5 0 states; and so, it is possible if the
third party has the organization and money to undertake legal
proceedings or legislative battles.
Third parties of the
left had little of either.
Third parties of the right can
expect to do better as evidenced by George Wallace's renewed
presidential candidacy in 1 9 7 2 and his vigorous presidential
primary campaigning.
3-0Haynes, op. cit,, 1-5 and 470.
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the two-party system.

Conversely,

Moisie Ostrogorski

reasoned that although third parties had often been refuges
for honest but absurd convictions seeking recognition, they
were incapable of winning political power because they
lacked the characteristics of a major party.

Since

Ostrogorski measured the level of success of a political
party upon the amount of political power that it possessed
or that it was capable of acquiring, he concluded that
powerless third parties were not to be considered as true
political parties and that in the electoral process they
should rather be regarded as hopeless protests only. 3-3The analyses and conclusions of both Haynes and
Ostrogorski are independently valid, but neither of these
treatments should be considered to be universally valid nor
applicable to third parties in general.

The apparent

disparity Is the result of the difficulty Involved in
accurately categorizing American third parties and the danger
involved in generalizing about a subject that possesses so
many variables that each occurrence could be unique.

For

instance, Haynes drew his analysis and conclusions from a
discussion of mid-Western third parties of social and economic
protest which were dissident wings of the major parties.
treated the Liberal Republican Movement of 1872-1884, the
Farmers Movement of 1873-1875# the Greenback Movement of
3-lostrogorski, op. cit., xxxix,

175# and 353*

He
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1880-1890, the Populist Movement of I 8 9 O-I 9 OO, and the
Progressive Movement of 1900-1910 , 1 2

These third parties

caused considerable voter agitation, and as a result, the
major parties adopted many policies which these third
parties had advocated,
qualified,

Haynes 1 conclusion, when properly

is correct.

On the other hand, Ostrogorski probably drew his con
clusions from an analysis of long enduring third party move
ments which advocated extremely radical policies and which
were overwhelmingly defeated in every election in which they
participated,

Ostrogorski fs c o n c i s i o n would be correct

for such American third parties as the Prohibitionists, who
advocate prohibition of alcoholic beverages,

the Vegetarians

who advocate the cessation of animal butchery for food
products,

or the ever-present Socialists who want a

Socialist America,
The above examples serve to demonstrate the necessity
of properly categorizing a third party before it is possible
to generalize concerning its role.

Distinct categories of

third parties are difficult to define since many qualities
are shared by several different groups.

Variations of

particular types also arise, making it more difficult to
identify the differentiating characteristics/

Many writers

have attempted to define categories of third parties, but
12Haynes, op. cit., A - 5 .
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these attempts usually do not allow for the variations which
occur.

For example, Clinton Rossiter identified his first

category of third parties as those of social and economic
protest such as the Populists, and his second category as
left wing splinter parties such as the Socialists.

However,

a left wing splinter party could be protesting economic and
social conditions, and if so, into which category should it
be placed?

In order to achieve a more accurate and meaning

ful description of third parties and thereby to be able to
assess their political roles, their traits should be
enumerated completely instead of attempting to "pigeon
hole^ third parties into incongruous categories.

Third

parties may be characterized as varieties of strategic
adaptations to different two-party situations in conflict?
and they may be identified by traits such as the following,
either singly or in combinations:

social and economic

protest; splinter secessionist or bolters, either left or
right wing or from a major party? single issue
obsessionists? regional,

sectional or single state? personal

following of a dissident hero? doctrinaire or ideological
and non-doctrinaire or non-ideological; transient or
short-lived? and local interest, ^-3
1 3Rossiter, op. cit., 4-5? Sorauf,
Z u c k e r , op. cit., 6 8 - 6 9 .

op. cit., 33?
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In his work on political parties, Norman Zucker
categorized the Bull Moose Party as a secessionist movement
from the Republican party, but in a similar work, Clinton
Rossiter categorized the Bull Moosers as the following of a
dissident hero.1^

Neither category fully identified the

movement, and as a result, any assessment of the m o v e m e n t s
role would be made more difficult.
The Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 shared the same fate as
nearly all of its predecessors? namely,

electoral failure.

Despite the fact that they won

33 electoral votes, the

Dixiecrats were overwhelmingly

defeated by both of the

parties,

However,

major

in many ways, the Dixiecrat Movement was

different from previous third party movements.

Most

significantly, the Dixiecrats were not pursuing an electoral
victory based upon a mythical awakening of the voters.
devised a two-pronged strategy

which could have placed

Thurmond in the White House or

which could have insured

T r u m a n ’s defeat.

They

In either case, the Dixiecrats reasoned

that southern political power would have been the end
product.

To achieve their strategic alternatives, the

Dixiecrats improvised political tactics which could have
provided the movement with a strong regional basis from
which to campaign.

They sought to take over the established

Democratic party structure in the South and establish a
l^Rossiter, op. cit., 5? Zucker, op, cit., 6 9 .
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regional conservative party.

The Dixiecrats wanted to win,

and they vigorously pursued this goal.

As a result of this

effort, they were able to get on the ballot in every state
in which they tried except Oklahoma, and they were
successful in acquiring significant financial assistance
from major contributors.

The failure of the Dixiecrat

Movement was the result of their inability to implement
their strategy and tactics,

it was not the result of

meaningless aspirations or frustrated expectations.
If we attempt to categorize the Dixiecrat Movement of
1948 as a right wing secessionist or splinter group of the
Democratic party, our effort would be accurate but
incomplete.^5

The Dixiecrat Movement of 1948 was a non-

ideological, regional Deep Southern black belt right wing
secessionist movement which opposed the liberal policies and
politics of the national Democratic party and which supported
national policies favorable to local conservative control of
southern political,

economic and social interests.

The

Dixiecrat Movement sought political power? and unlike most
previous third party movements,
for achieving this goal.

it possessed the potential

Because of its goal and its

potential for electoral success, the role of the Dixiecrat
Movement must be considered to have been that of a political
party actually participating in an electoral process and not
-^This is how Zucker and Rossiter categorized them.
See, Zucker, op, cit,, 6 9 and Rossiter, op. cit., 5.
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that of a pointless protest or organized agitation movement
which may influence the electoral process but not actually
participate therein.

APPENDIX I
THE SOUTHERN BLACK BELT REGIONS
The Virginia and North Carolina black belts are divided
by the eastern section of their border, and they generally
encompass an over-all area extending from Vir g i n i a ’s
Eastern Shore, through Petersburg, Virginia, to WinstonSalem, Raleigh and Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

The only

other black belt region in North Carolina is an area in the
southern part of the state surrounding Fayetteville.
Southeastern and Central South Carolina constitutes South
I
Carol i n a’s black belt.
This area is approximately bound on
the west by Columbia and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean.
G e o r g i a ’s black belt is an arching strip across central
Georgia bound on the north by Augusta and Atlanta and on the
south by Savannah,

Macon and Albany.

There are two isolated

black belt regions in northeast and northwest Florida.

One

is on the east coast in the Jacksonville area and the other
is along the west central Georgia border in the Tallahassee
area,
A l a b a m a ’s black belt consists of an irregularly defined
strip across southern Georgia approximately bound by
Anniston, Birmingham and the Tuscaloosa area in the north and
by a line between Greenville and Dothan extending through the
northern tip of Mobile Bay to the Mississippi border in the

110

Ill
south.

The black belt regions of Mississippi are located

in two separate areas.

The first on the central eastern

(Alabama) border extending north to south from Columbus to
Meridian and the other extends along the Mississippi River
from the Tennessee border through Jackson to the Louisiana
delta border.
Mississippi.

These regions contain approximately half of
The Tennessee black belt is actually an

extension of the Mississippi black belt Into the Memphis
area.

The Arkansas black belt is also contiguous to the

Mississippi River and is bound on the west by Paragould,
Little Rock and Pine Bluff.

Eastern Louisiana’s black belt

is similarly situated along the Mississippi with Vicksburg,
Opelousas and Baton Rouge providing western and southern
boundaries.

Louisiana's black belt also extends along its

northern border through Monroe and Shreveport.

The Texas

black belt is located in the eastern corner of the state and
runs from approximately Longview to the Houston area.
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for effectuating the principles upon which the party is
founded? that a platform of principles is a solemn covenant
with the people and with the members of the party? that no
leader of the party, in temporary power, has the right or
•privilege to proceed contrary to the fundamental principles
of the party,

or the letter or spirit of the Constitution

of the United States? that to act contrary to these principles
is a breach of faith, a usurpation of power, and a
forfeiture of the party name and party leadership.
We believe that the protection of the American people
against the onward march of totalitarian government requires
a faithful observance of Article X of the American Bill of
Rights which provides that?

"The powers not delegated to

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,

or

to the people.”
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATES' RIGHTS
We direct attention to the fact that the first platform
of the Democratic Party, adopted in 18^0, resolved that:
"Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere
113

with or control the domestic institutions of the several
states, and that such states are the sole and proper judges
of everything appertaining to their own affairs not
prohibited by the Constitution."
Such pronouncement is the cornerstone of the Democratic
Party.

A long train of abuses and usurpations of power by

unfaithful leaders who are alien to the Democratic parties
of the states here represented has become intolerable to
those who believe in the preservation of constitutional
government and individual liberty in America.
The Executive Department of the government is promoting
the gradual but certain growth of a totalitarian state by
domination and control of a politically minded Supreme
Court.

As examples of the threat to our form of government,

the Executive Department, with the aid of the Supreme Court,
has asserted national dominion and control of submerged oilbearing lands in California,

schools in Oklahoma and

Missouri, primary elections in Texas, South Carolina and
Louisiana, restrictive covenants in New York and the
District of Columbia, and other jurisdictions, as well as
religious instruction in Illinois.
PERIL TO BASIC RIGHTS
By asserting paramount Federal rights in these
instances, a totalitarian concept has been promulgated which
threatens the integrity of the states and the basic rights
of their citizens.
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We have repeatedly remonstrated with the leaders of the
national organization of our party but our petitions,
entreaties and warnings have been treated with contempt.
The latest response to our entreaties was a Democratic con
vention in Philadelphia rigged to embarrass and humiliate
the South.
This alleged Democratic assembly called for a civilrights law that would eliminate segregation of every kind
from all American life, prohibit all forms of discrimination
In private employment, in public and private instruction and
administration and treatment of students; in the operation
of public and private health facilities? in all transporta
tion, and require equal access to all places of public
accommodation for persons of all races, colors, creeds and
national origin.
PROPOSED FBI POWERS
This infamous and iniquitous program calls for the
reorganization of the civil rights section of the Department
of Justice with a substantial Increase in a bureaucratic
staff to be devoted exclusively to the enforcement of the
civil rights program; the establishment within the FBI of a
special unit of investigators and a police state in a
totalitarian,

centralized, bureaucratic government.

This convention hypocritically denounced totalitarian
ism abroad but unblushingly proposed and approved it at
home.

This convention would strengthen the grip of a police
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state upon a liberty-loving people by the imposition of
penalties upon local public officers who failed or refused
to act in accordance with Its ideas in suppressing mob
violence.
We point out that if a foreign power undertook to force
upon the people of the United States the measures advocated
by the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, with respect
to civil rights,

it would mean war and the entire nation

would resist such effort.
The convention that insulted the South in the party
platform advocated giving the Virgin Islands and other
dependencies of the United States "the maximum degree of
local self-government."
When an effort was made to amend this part of the plat
form so as to make it read that the party favored giving the
Virgin Islands and the several states the maximum degree of
local self-government, the amendment adding the words "these
several states" was stricken out and the sovereign states
were denied the rights that the party favors giving the
Virgin Islands.
PAST LOYALTY
We point out that the South, with clock-like regularity,
has furnished the Democratic Party approximately 50 percent
of the votes necessary to nominate a President every four
years for nearly a century.

In 1920 the only states in the

union that went Democratic were the eleven Southern states.

Notwithstanding this rugged loyalty to the party, the
masters of political intrigue now allow Republican states in
which there is scarcely a Democratic office holder to
dominate and control the party and fashion its policies.
NEW POLICY
As Democrats who are irrevocably committed to democracy
as defined and expounded by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson
and Woodrow Wilson, and who believe that all necessary
steps must be taken for its preservation, we declare to the
people of the United States as follows:
1.

We believe that the Constitution of the United

States is the greatest charter of human liberty ever con
ceived by the mind of man.
2.

We oppose all efforts to invade or destroy the

rights vouchsafed by it to every citizen of this republic.
3.

We stand for social and economic justice, which we

believe can be vouchsafed to all citizens only by a strict
adherence to our Constitution and the avoidance of any
invasion or destruction of the constitutional rights of the
states and individuals.

We oppose the totalitarian,

centralized, bureaucratic government and the police state
called for by the platforms adopted by the Democratic and
Republican conventions,
4.

We stand for the segregation of the races and the

racial integrity of each race; the constitutional right to
choose one's associates; to accept private employment

without governmental interference, and to earn one's living
in any lawful way.

We oppose the elimination of segregation

employment by Federal bureaucrats called for by the misnamed
civil rights program.

We favor home rule,

local self-

government and a minimum interference with individual
rights.
5.

We oppose and condemn the action of the Democratic

convention in sponsoring a civil rights program calling for
the elimination of segregation,

social equality by Federal

fiat, regulation of private employment practices, voting and
local law enforcement.
6.

We affirm that the effective enforcement of such a

program would be utterly destructive of the social,

economic

and political life of the Southern people, and of other
localities in which there may be differences in race, creed
or national origin in appreciable numbers.
7.

We stand for the checks and balances provided by

the three departments of our Government.

We oppose the

usurpation of legislative functions by the executive and
judicial departments.

We unreservedly condemn the effort to

establish nation-wide a police state in this republic that
would destroy the last vestige of liberty enjoyed by a
citizen.
8.

We demand that there be returned to the people, to

whom of right they belong, those powers needed for the
preservation of human rights and the discharge of our
responsibility as Democrats for human welfare.

We oppose a
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denial of those rights by political parties, a barter or
sale of those rights by a political convention, as well as
any invasion or violation of those rights by the Federal
Government.
We call upon all Democrats and upon all other loyal
Americans who are opposed to totalxtarlanlsm

i ioixits cxiin.

abroad to unite with us in ignominiously defeating Harry
S. Truman and Thomas E. Dewey, and every other candidate
for public office who would establish a police state in the
United States of America.
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